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Unifying Antitrust Enforcement for 
the Digital Age 
John O. McGinnis* & Linda Sun** 
Abstract  
As the digital revolution continues to transform competition 
among businesses, U.S. antitrust enforcement has struggled to 
remain effective. The U.S. has long depended on a system of dual 
antitrust enforcement through both the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). 
Modern technology has greatly exacerbated existing structural 
deficiencies of the two-headed approach, at times resulting in 
deadlock. The two agencies approach new antitrust issues 
generated by computational technologies differently and fight 
over who should lead key investigations, leading to economic 
uncertainty in the most important business sectors. These 
enforcement disagreements can also hobble the government’s 
response to significant national security issues emerging from 
the interplay of technological competition among private 
companies and among nation states. Further, dual enforcement 
hinders government action in the newly critical area of data 
privacy: the agency responsible, the FTC, suffers a mission 
overload of enforcing both antitrust and privacy, which can work 
against each other.  
The best solution is for the DOJ to become the sole antitrust 
enforcement agency. First, antitrust decisions, especially in the 
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technology arena, directly affect geopolitical competition and 
international relations, a province constitutionally assigned to 
the president. It therefore makes more sense for the DOJ, which, 
unlike the FTC, is controlled by the president, to direct antitrust 
enforcement as one piece of a larger foreign policy. Second, 
consolidating enforcement in the DOJ would also allow the FTC 
to concentrate on enforcing privacy law, free from its 
sometimes-conflicting antitrust mandate. Dual enforcement of 
antitrust law should yield to single agency enforcement, with the 
FTC enforcing privacy and the DOJ enforcing antitrust. 
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For over a century, the U.S. has maintained a system of 
dual antitrust enforcement. Antitrust laws are executed by two 
federal agencies: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) through its Antitrust Division.1 
Throughout their histories, the agencies have struggled to 
navigate their overlapping jurisdiction, often butting heads and 
creating redundancies.2 With the digital revolution, existing 
cracks in the system have widened to the point of rendering the 
current system irrelevant and ineffective. Dual enforcement is 
a waste of government resources that duplicates efforts, fails to 
provide the technology industry with reasonable certainty for 
business and investment decisions, introduces barriers to a 
cohesive foreign policy and defense strategy, and hinders the 
development of privacy regulation and enforcement. 
Accelerated technological change exacerbates three main 
problems with the dual antitrust agency system. First, while 
dual enforcement has always created uncertainty and thus 
harmed business planning and economic growth, developments 
in computer technology have made these problems more acute.3 
In recent decades, the technology industry has experienced the 
rise of a handful of dominant companies, such as Facebook, 
Google, Amazon, and Apple, all central to the economic vitality 
 
 1. See William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual 
Federal Enforcement?, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 508 (1996) (explaining the 
U.S. antitrust enforcement structure).  
 2. See, e.g., Norman Armstrong et al., Senators Urge DOJ to Develop 
Antitrust Guidance for Licensing of Standard Essential Patents, JD SUPRA 
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q8H4-9JPL (“The FTC and DOJ have adopted 
opposing positions at times [with regard to antitrust enforcement], and there 
have even been internal inconsistencies within the agencies.”). 
 3. See Ernest Gellhorn et al., Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual 
Enforcement? A Proposal for Rationalization, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 695, 714 
(1990) (remarking that as markets have become more competitive “dual 
enforcement is a luxury we can no longer afford”). 
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of the nation.4 Contemporaneously, debate has erupted over 
how antitrust law should be adapted to regulate these 
companies, which have introduced new platforms, markets, and 
products that were not anticipated by traditional tests.5 
Advocates for cracking down on tech giants like Apple and 
Google argue that the companies wield outsized market power 
and harm competition.6 On the other side, critics of increased 
competition regulation for the technology sector note that 
technology advances so quickly that seemingly-entrenched 
monopolists are in fact easily replaced by competition.7 At such 
a pivotal moment, the FTC and DOJ have failed to work 
together effectively. Instead, inter-agency fighting and a divided 
framework have created uncertainty for the regulation of the 
economically vital technology industry.8  
Second, the growing power and ever widening scope of 
computational technology has entangled antitrust policy with 
international politics and national security.9 Electronic 
 
 4. See Kyle Daly, Big Tech’s Power, in 4 Numbers, AXIOS (July 27, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/PE4G-A2EY (reporting that the combined annual revenue of 
Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple was $773 billion in 2019). 
 5. See Scott Scher et al., United States: Digital Platforms, in GLOBAL 
COMPETITION REVIEW INSIGHT: AMERICAS ANTITRUST REVIEW 2020 68, 68–74 
(2019), https://perma.cc/3RBW-DMQ8 (PDF) (evaluating how the new digital 
age impacts the DOJ’s and FTC’s fundamental analyses). 
 6. See Rachel Martin, Have Tech Companies Become Too Powerful? 
Congress Will Investigate, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 4, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://
perma.cc/KU7Y-LA2X (“Some [members of] Congress think that [Facebook, 
Google, Apple, and Amazon] have gotten way too big and have way too much 
power to the point that they are snuffing out competition and actually harming 
consumers.”). 
 7. See Catherine Tucker, Network Effects and Market Power: What Have 
We Learned in the Last Decade?, 32 ANTITRUST 72, 73 (2018), https://perma.cc
/PP9T-SBUN (PDF) (“[N]etwork effects do not imply entrenchment and can 
actually lead to quicker destabilization of a market leader position.”). 
 8. See Lauren Feiner, Here’s Why the Top Two Antitrust Enforcers in the 
US Are Squabbling Over Who Gets to Regulate Big Tech, CNBC (Sept. 18, 
2019, 10:31 AM), https://perma.cc/2SYZ-XW3N (noting the complaint among 
some lawmakers that the DOJ and FTC are “wasting time fighting with each 
other instead of digging into their investigations”). 
 9. See Jon Bateman, The Antitrust Threat to National Security, WALL 
ST.  J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 6:43 PM), https://perma.cc/GK4B-7E8Z (“Any responsible 
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technology has increased the avenues of attack and transformed 
traditional weapons of war.10 Innovations in hardware and 
software have introduced novel methods of espionage and 
cyberwarfare such as computational propaganda, trolling, and 
sophisticated hacking.11 This technological acceleration has led 
to an international battle for technological dominance that has 
been dubbed a “technology cold war.”12 China and Russia in 
particular have dedicated significant resources towards hostile 
social manipulation or information/influence warfare.13 Ceding 
control over communications technologies to foreign powers may 
leave the U.S. vulnerable to surveillance and infrastructure 
takedowns.14 Hacking groups have targeted U.S. defense 
contractors and telecommunications companies.15 As both the 
Obama and Trump administrations recognized,16 antitrust 
 
antitrust debate must address the national security risks of breaking up Big 
Tech—and the parallel risks of keeping these companies intact.”).  
 10. See Jon Harper, U.S., Allies Bolstering Electronic Warfare Systems, 
NAT’L DEF. MAG. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/75JW-Y94B (“The U.S. is 
expected to lead the way in electronic warfare spending [over the next several 
years.]”). 
 11. MICHAEL J. MAZARR ET AL., HOSTILE SOCIAL MANIPULATION: PRESENT 
REALITIES AND EMERGING TRENDS 22–23 (RAND Corp. ed., 2019), https://
perma.cc/SP6C-LBJJ (PDF). 
 12. Billy Perrigo, Britain Sides with China in Technology Cold War, TIME 
(Jan. 30, 2020, 6:43 AM), https://perma.cc/Q67Y-7AZP. 
 13. See MAZARR ET AL., supra note 11, at xii (“Russia and China believe 
themselves to be engaged in an information war with the West . . . and have 
begun to invest significant resources in such tools.”). 
 14. See id. at xiii (“[D]espite the apparent limited effects to date, the 
marriage of the hostile intent of several leading powers and the evolution of 
several interrelated areas of information technology has the potential to vastly 
increase the effectiveness and reach of these [technological social 
manipulation] techniques over time.”). 
 15. See 9 Latest Cyber-Espionage Affairs, EC-COUNCIL BLOG (Mar. 7, 
2019), https://perma.cc/D5T9-MMYD (“[A] group of Chinese-linked 
hackers . . . targeted defense contractors and telecommunications companies 
in the United States and Southeast Asia.”). 
 16. See Liz Gaines, President Obama Says Europe’s Aggressiveness 
Toward Google Comes from Protecting Lesser Competitors, BENTON INST. FOR 
BROADBAND & SOC’Y (Feb. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/Y9XR-6SKY; Caoimhe 
Toman, Trump Attacks EU Sanctions US Tech Companies, SHARECAST NEWS 
(June 26, 2019, 5:18 PM), https://perma.cc/UZ7W-GBT8. 
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enforcement can impede domestic technological advancement 
by giving foreign companies—collaborating with foreign 
governments—a competitive advantage. Because of the 
increased importance of antitrust to national security, 
enforcement should be left to the DOJ alone. Its leaders serve at 
the pleasure of the president, whose office has greater 
perspective and tools available in protecting the nation and 
navigating international relationships.  
Third, digital technology has amplified a central issue of 
consumer protection—privacy. Technology has increased the 
amount and the ease by which personal data is collected, stored, 
and shared, leaving consumers in a vulnerable position. The 
FTC currently oversees both domestic antitrust enforcement 
and privacy, but has no more than fifty employees working on 
privacy issues.17 Without a doubt, the agency requires more 
people dedicated to privacy law and regulation.18 But more than 
a higher headcount, the FTC needs to shed its antitrust 
jurisdiction because the underlying purpose of competition law 
can conflict with the development of privacy regulation.19 
Antitrust law promotes the free market, while privacy laws 
disturb the free market to protect consumers.20 Agencies operate 
more efficiently when they can focus on a coherent mission free 
of internal tension.21 Eliminating the FTC’s antitrust 
responsibilities would enable the agency to give the consumer 
 
 17. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The FTC Can Rise to the Privacy 
Challenge, but Not Without Help from Congress, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 8, 
2019), https://perma.cc/YA4Z-HS67 (describing the FTC’s workforce). In 
comparison, the U.K.’s information commissioner’s office has over seven 
hundred  employees dedicated to privacy and data protection. Id. 
 18. See id. (“Resources are the FTC’s greatest constraint. It is a small 
agency charged with a broad mission in competition and consumer 
protection.”). 
 19. See Ernest Gellhorn, Two’s a Crowd: The FTC’s Redundant Antitrust 
Powers, AM. ENTER. INST. (Dec. 7, 1981), https://perma.cc/L22B-W354 (“The 
whole theory of consumer protection is very different from that which should 
underlie antitrust enforcement. Properly defined, antitrust intervenes in the 
market only to correct market failures by barring conduct that distorts market 
forces or otherwise by restoring competitive opportunities.”). 
 20. See id.  
 21. See infra notes 371–379 and accompanying text.  
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protection problems of data privacy and security the focus they 
warrant. 
A recent important case, Federal Trade Commission v. 
Qualcomm, Inc.,22 showcases the contemporary confusion 
created by retaining two antitrust enforcement agencies.23 The 
FTC brought suit against Qualcomm for allegedly violating 
antitrust law with its “no license, no chips” policy, which 
required phone makers to license Qualcomm’s patents if they 
wanted to purchase the company’s smartphone chips.24 In the 
appeal before the Ninth Circuit,25 the Department of Justice 
took the podium to argue directly against the FTC’s position on 
standard-essential patents, an issue of great importance to 
technological development. Additionally, the Department of 
Justice argued that the suit, brought by one of the government’s 
own agencies, posed a threat to national security because 
Qualcomm’s competitive position as a domestic chipmaker was 
important to maintain for the nation’s safety.26 The impact of 
the case will be far-reaching, as evidenced by the multiple 
amicus briefs filed by scholars, companies, and organizations in 
fields from economics to patent law.27 With so much on the line, 
 
 22. 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 23. See generally id. See John D. McKinnon & Brent Kendall, U.S. 
Antitrust Enforcers Signal Discord over Probes of Big Tech, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
16, 2019, 10:11 PM), https://perma.cc/R8AV-2NKL (referencing Senator Mike 
Lee’s statement regarding the Qualcomm case that “[t]his kind of dysfunction 
and confusion illustrates why having two agencies at loggerheads does not 
make for effective antitrust enforcement”). 
 24. See Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 669, 703. 
 25. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 26. See Brief for the United States of America (Dep’t of Justice) as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur at 2, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122) (“[T]he court erred in imposing an 
expansive compulsory licensing remedy . . . that . . . has the potential to 
negatively impact innovation in 5G technologies and compromise national 
security.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Brief for Antitrust and Patent Law Professors, Economists, 
and Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant and Reversal, FTC v. 
Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122); Brief for Alliance 
of U.S. Startups & Investors for Jobs (“USIJ”) as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellant Qualcomm Incorporated, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th 
Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122); Brief for Dolby Laboratories, Inc. as Amici Curiae 
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the agencies wasted government resources, created confusion 
for corporations, and undermined a coherent foreign policy by 
advocating against each other. Even the Ninth Circuit noted the 
oddity of a divided opinion from the government.28 
This paper proceeds in two parts. Part I explains how the 
importance of technology to the economy together with the 
difficulty of applying antitrust laws to new technology combine 
to make the uncertainty generated by dual enforcement a 
crippling problem. The dispute between the FTC and DOJ 
regarding standard-essential patents (SEPs) exemplifies the 
confusion.29 Even outside of the technology disputes, the dual 
agency structure has not worked, creating costly inefficiencies 
and turf disputes. The Part examines the problems that flow 
from a duplicative structure—from wasted resources to 
substantive delays.30 These concerns show that antitrust 
enforcement must be consolidated under one agency. 
The Part also responds to the view that dual enforcement 
may have compensating advantages by bringing to bear 
different views on complicated issues and letting the courts 
decide which is better. Courts are unlikely to be good at choosing 
between agency views in an area as complicated as antitrust. 
Indeed, more than in other areas, courts rely on the 
government’s published antitrust guidelines for their 
framework of analysis.31 Moreover, antitrust cases take a very 
 
Supporting Neither Party, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 
2020) (No. 19-16122). 
 28. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 935 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Although 
the hardship to the party opposing the stay and the public interest usually 
merge when the government is the opposing party, this case is unique, as the 
government itself is divided about the propriety of the judgment and its impact 
on the public interest.” (internal citations omitted)). Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled in favor of Qualcomm on legal grounds. Id. at 757. But that 
victory for the DOJ’s position was not based on foreign policy considerations, 
and another panel could have come out for the FTC, as did the district court.  
 29. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 30. See infra Part I. 
 31. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
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long time to resolve,32 and the uncertainty created by agency 
disagreement can retard the most dynamic sector of the 
economy. Finally, if this approach were sound, the government 
would generally use dual agencies to enforce major laws, like 
those applying to securities or the environment, but it does not 
do so.  
Part II discusses why antitrust enforcement should be 
consolidated in the Department of Justice. First, advancing 
technology has exacerbated the effects of antitrust policy on 
national security and rising data privacy concerns.33 Therefore, 
the DOJ should lead antitrust enforcement to enable the 
executive branch to coordinate enforcement with foreign affairs. 
Whatever one’s view of a particular president, the need for a 
unitary voice in foreign affairs has long been established.34 And 
there is no substitute for the national security apparatus and 
the intelligence it brings that is under the president’s control. 
Second, consolidation of antitrust within the DOJ would 
enable the FTC to expand its efforts on protecting privacy, the 
pressing consumer protection problem of the technological age. 
Agencies do better when they have a focused mission without 
internal tensions.35 Antitrust law promotes competition and yet 
privacy law often attempts to guarantee a level of privacy 
stronger than that which would be delivered by the market.36 As 
 
 32. See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 675, 692 (2010) (“[T]he average private antitrust lawsuit today 
takes over six years to disposition . . . .”). 
 33. See Dakota Foster, Antitrust Investigations Have Deep Implications 
for AI and National Security, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2, 2020), https://perma.cc
/VG6A-HVJ7 (“With defense officials arguing that U.S. military superiority 
may hinge on artificial intelligence capabilities, antitrust action aimed at 
America’s largest tech companies . . . could affect the United States’ 
technological edge.”). 
 34. The notion that the president alone is responsible for the nation’s 
foreign policy decisions goes back to the early republic. The most famous 
articulation at that time is John Marshall’s statement in the House of 
Representatives: “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” 10 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 613 (1800); see infra notes 256–261 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra notes 314–316 and accompanying text.  
 36. See Mark MacCarthy, Privacy Is Not an Antitrust Issue, FORBES (Oct. 
1, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://perma.cc/5WSS-SFCQ (“How can ensuring 
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a result, most foreign nations have an agency devoted to privacy 
law distinct from that devoted to antitrust law. The United 
States should join that international consensus. 
I.  CONSOLIDATING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
Antitrust enforcement should be consolidated under a 
single agency. The failures of dual enforcement by the FTC and 
DOJ can be placed in two buckets: inefficiencies and 
inconsistencies. Dual enforcement causes duplication of effort 
and uncoordinated workflow, but also divergent procedures and 
uncertain outcomes.37 These problems are exemplified and 
exacerbated in our age of technological acceleration.  
Subpart A shows that regulation of the technology industry, 
probably the most important area of our economy, is an 
emerging area of bitter contention. Both the FTC and DOJ 
regulate competition issues in technology, and the agencies 
have struggled to divide investigations of the industry due to 
the intertwined actors and complex issues.38 First, the subpart 
describes the novel challenges brought on by electronic 
technology. Since traditional antitrust tests are often an uneasy 
fit for new markets and methods of competition introduced by 
technology,39 divided enforcement exacerbates the uncertainty 
in how antitrust law will be applied. Second, the subpart 
examines agency turf wars over the industry: the agencies have 
 
reasonable competitive conduct in markets advance consumer privacy 
interests? It seems like a classic case of apples and oranges.”). 
 37. William Blumenthal, Models for Merging the U.S. Antitrust Agencies, 
1 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 24, 29–30 (2013). 
 38. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23 (citing tech issues as a “major 
contributing factor” to the strained relationship between the FTC and the 
DOJ). 
 39. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Ilene Knable Gotts, In Search of a 
Competition Doctrine for Information Technology Markets: Recent Antitrust 
Developments in the Online Sector, in COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPETITION LAW 
KEY ISSUES IN THE TELECOMS, MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY SECTORS 69 (Fabrizio 
Cugia di Sant’Orsola et al. eds., 2015) (discussing cases that illustrate the 
challenges of enforcing competition law in information technology markets). 
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struggled to coordinate investigation of tech companies40 to the 
detriment of the companies, consumers, and innovation as a 
whole. 
Finally, the subpart offers a case study of how technological 
developments have led to intractable disagreement between the 
agencies by way of examining standard-essential patents. 
Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs) provide the foundation for 
future technological progress, but the DOJ and FTC disagree on 
whether licensing of SEPs should be forced to promote 
competition. Without resolution, this divide leaves key U.S. 
companies in the dark as to how to structure deals, hindering 
technological advancement. 
 Subpart B recalls that the problems created by dual 
enforcement, while more acute than ever, are not new and are 
not the result of a carefully deliberated choice by Congress.41 
Eliminating dual enforcement would not only rationalize 
antitrust enforcement at home, but also bring the United States 
into conformity with technology agencies around the world.  
A.  Antitrust Regulation of Technology 
Antitrust regulation of technology is vital to the economy.42 
It has the power to change the future of the tech industry, and 
those changes in turn have domino effects on sectors from 
healthcare and manufacturing to transportation and energy.43 
 
 40. See John D. McKinnon & James V. Grimaldi, Justice Department, 
FTC Skirmish Over Antitrust Turf, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:45 PM), 
https://perma.cc/R8AV-2NKL. 
 41. See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, 
Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 (2003) 
(describing the origins of the FTC Act passed by Congress in 1914, which 
created the FTC and empowered it to prosecute “unfair methods of 
competition”). 
 42. See, e.g., Makada Henry-Nickie et al., Trends in the Information 
Technology Sector, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/8YMZ-
FA6T (“Digital technologies have risen to prominence as a critical determinant 
of economic growth, national security, and international competitiveness.”). 
 43. See 5G & the Future of Connectivity: 20 Industries the Tech Could 
Transform, CBINSIGHTS (Mar. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/W4DR-KQL2 
(describing numerous industries that are predicted to be disrupted by 5G 
technology); M. Ishaq Nadiri et al., Impact of Modern Communication 
 
316 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2021) 
 
While the application of antitrust law to the technology sector is 
a hot topic among scholars, regulators, and politicians, the path 
forward is complex.44 It is unclear how competition law will be 
applied to emerging technology, because traditional antitrust 
tests must be adapted to new markets, products, and methods 
of competition introduced by the digital revolution.45  
 
Infrastructure on Productivity, Production Structure and Factor Demands of 
U.S. Industries: Impact Revisited, 42 TELECOMM. POL’Y 433, 439–40 (2018) 
(concluding that communication technology has increased productivity in all 
industries, with health and construction in the top five industries). 
 44. See, e.g., Kaushik Basu, New Technology and Increasing Returns: The 
End of the Antitrust Century? 12–16 (IZA—Inst. of Lab. Econs., Working 
Paper, IZA Policy Paper No. 146, 2019), https://perma.cc/E4H5-M68D (PDF) 
(calling for new antitrust laws to address digital technology); TIM WU, THE 
CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018) (arguing that 
antitrust regulation should be reinvigorated to address Big Tech); Thibault 
Schrepel, Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The Blockchain Antitrust 
Paradox, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 281, 281–85 (2019) (discussing how regulators 
should tackle issues introduced by blockchain technology); Margaret Harding 
McGill, Tech’s Long Hot Summer of Antitrust, AXIOS (May 26, 2020), https://
perma.cc/35P8-YUBS (highlighting action by the DOJ, House Judiciary, state 
attorneys general, and FTC against tech giants); John D. McKinnon & Deepa 
Seetharaman, FTC Expands Antitrust Investigation into Big Tech, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 11, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://perma.cc/UP7C-43AB; Barbara Ortutay, 
Big Tech Is Now a Big Punching Bag for Politicians, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 
11, 2019), https://perma.cc/H5HB-2EUQ (noting bipartisan criticism of Big 
Tech); Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM 
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/QH3K-M7XZ (stating the then-presidential 
candidate’s platform in regards to antitrust action against Big Tech). 
 45. See Cristina Caffarra & Oliver Latham, Is Antitrust in Need of 
Disruption: What Is Disruptive Innovation and What, If Anything, Does 
Competition Policy Need to Do to React to It?, 2 ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 86, 
88–93 (2018), https://perma.cc/83ZC-Y2NS (PDF) (discussing how “existing 
antitrust theories of harm might need to be adapted in a context of disruptive 
innovation”); WILSON C. FREEMAN & JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
ANTITRUST AND “BIG TECH” 33–35 (2019), https://perma.cc/WDB7-CUTC (PDF) 
(stating that some commentators have proposed changes to antitrust law to 
promote competition in technology markets while others have advocated for 
competition regulation rules tailored specifically to the technology sector); 
Karry Lai, Antitrust Regulators Struggle with Big Data, INT’L FIN. L. REV. 
(June 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/335U-DMF5 (“In an age of big tech where the 
likes of Google, Facebook and Amazon have monopolized markets, unbound by 
traditional antitrust laws, regulators around the world are playing catch 
up . . . .”). 
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Thus, dual enforcement has greater risks than ever before, 
both because disagreement is more likely and costs of 
uncertainty are greater. This subpart outlines this potential for 
uncertainty in a variety of areas of antitrust doctrine. In fact, 
the risk is not just potential. The DOJ and FTC already disagree 
on the important issue of how to regulate SEPs, creating 
uncertainty in a growing industry worth billions of dollars.46 
The agencies are additionally fighting over who should take the 
lead in regulating high tech, resulting in divergent 
investigations when antitrust analysis requires consideration of 
the entire competitive market to reach sound conclusions.47 
1.  The Need for Certainty in Antitrust Regulation of 
Technology 
A unified approach to antitrust regulation is especially 
important when it comes to the technology industry for three 
reasons. First, the rapidly growing technology industry is at the 
center of the U.S. economy: in 2018, the internet sector 
accounted for $2.1 trillion of the economy and 10 percent of the 
GDP.48 Uncertainty about antitrust rules created by dual 
enforcement hinders economic growth.   
Second, technological industries are especially sensitive to 
shifts in antitrust policy because antitrust actions can change 
the trajectory of fast-changing industries. For instance, the 
DOJ’s antitrust enforcement action against the Bell System 
broke up the monopoly in telephony.49 One court later 
summarized the effect as “an unprecedented flowering of 
innovation” in the telecom industry.50 Agency antitrust action 
also played a large role in the growth of software, browser, and 
 
 46. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 47. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 48. David Shepardson, Internet Sector Contributes $2.1 Trillion to U.S. 
Economy: Industry Group, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://perma.cc
/4D84-MBKC.  
 49. See Bret Swanson, Lessons from the AT&T Break Up, 30 Years Later, 
AEIDEAS (Jan. 3, 2014), https://perma.cc/XFT8-45EB.  
 50. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 809 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1995). 
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web company competition.51 In anticipation of a Justice 
Department antitrust suit,52 IBM unbundled its software and 
hardware products in the 1960s,53 dramatically changing the 
software market. Nearly overnight, software went from a 
typically free good to a commercial product.54 Governmental 
antitrust enforcement is additionally credited for Microsoft’s 
1997 investment in its rival company Apple, which saved the 
then-nascent company from the brink of bankruptcy.55 Microsoft 
likely acted in self-preservation because it faced antitrust 
scrutiny that came to a head in a DOJ suit the year after.56 The 
 
 51. See, e.g., Adi Robertson, How the Antitrust Battles of the ‘90s Set the 
Stage for Today’s Tech Giants, VERGE (Sep. 6, 2018, 11:57 AM), https://
perma.cc/L2AU-GT8X (“[T]he Microsoft settlement is credited with giving web 
companies like Google—and browsers like Google Chrome, which overtook 
Internet Explorer in 2012—space to grow.”). 
 52. See generally United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 475 F. Supp. 
1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 53. IBM announced its unbundling prior to the antitrust suit, as what 
many believe was a preemptive action. See Martin Campbell-Kelly & Daniel 
D. Garcia-Swartz, Pragmatism, Not Ideology: Historical Perspectives on IBM’s 
Adoption of Open-Source Software, 21 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 229, 236 (2009); 
Burton Grad, A Personal Recollection: IBM’s Unbundling of Software and 
Services, 24 IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 64, 65 (2002) (“IBM 
executives . . . held discussions with senior DOJ attorneys and believed that 
IBM could preempt a DOJ suit by announcing it would unbundle its services, 
then doing so promptly.”); cf. James Pethokoukis, Taking a Second Look at the 
Idea That Antitrust Action Created the U.S. Software Industry, AEIDEAS (Jan. 
12, 2018), https://perma.cc/WNH8-KUTG (proposing an alternate take that 
perhaps market forces were the primary reason for the decision to unbundle 
rather than government action); see also John E. Lopatka, United States v. 
IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 146–48 (2000) 
(arguing that the suit against IBM was a poor decision). 
 54. See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Development and Structure of the 
International Software Industry, 1950–1990, 24 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 73, 88 
(1995); Software Becomes a Product, COMPUT. HIST. MUSEUM, https://perma.cc
/Y4E6-RSU8. 
 55. Catherine Clifford, When Microsoft Saved Apple: Steve Jobs and Bill 
Gates Show Eliminating Competition Isn’t the Only Way to Win, CNBC (June 
12, 2020, 11:48 AM), https://perma.cc/V759-7XTH. 
 56. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
The suit began in 1998. See Carlson Martin, Did Bill Gates Save Apple from 
Bankruptcy or Microsoft from the Law?, MONEYCONTROL (Jan. 31, 2019, 1:25 
PM), https://perma.cc/7RNC-788Y (“Bill Gates didn’t want his company 
broken up by a long-drawn-out court battle. So what better way to show 
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Microsoft settlement itself is “credited with giving web 
companies like Google—and browsers like Google 
Chrome . . . space to grow.”57 These actions changed the 
technological landscape, and future antitrust decisions 
regarding technology companies will have just as significant of 
an impact, if not more. 
  Moreover, antitrust policy is very important to the 
research and development that is the heart of innovation in 
tech, particularly as more research and development has moved 
from the public sector to the private sector.58 Private companies 
are affected more directly by antitrust policies.59 Even the 
financing of technology is dependent on antitrust law. Today, as 
discussed in more detail below,60 the primary reason a tech 
start-up receives funding from investors is its acquisition 
potential; merger and acquisition policies play a significant 
role.61 Once again, certainty here is important for investors, and 
 
Microsoft isn’t a monopoly than by supporting the competition.”); John C. 
Abell, Aug. 6, 1997: Apple Rescued—by Microsoft, WIRED (Aug. 6, 2009, 12:00 
AM), https://perma.cc/9QW3-AWFD (“Timing mattered: [Microsoft] was in the 
midst of an image-tarnishing antitrust fight over its heavy-handed promotion 
of IE during the height of the browser wars with Netscape.”). 
 57. Robertson, supra note 51. 
 58. David M. Hart, Antitrust and Technology Innovation, 15 ISSUES SCI. 
& TECH. 75, 75 (1999) (“As the funding and performance of scientific and 
technological activity increasingly shift into the private sector in the coming 
decades, the relative importance of antitrust policy will continue to grow.”). 
 59. See id.  
In some sectors, antitrust policy has been far more consequential 
for research and innovation than the federal R&D spending policies 
that have attracted far more attention from analysts and 
policymakers. As the funding and performance of scientific and 
technological activity increasingly shift into the private sector in 
the coming decades, the relative importance of antitrust policy will 
continue to grow. 
 60. See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 61. Ernesto Falcon, Senate Antitrust Hearing Explores Big Tech’s Merger 
Mania, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/97BP-
GWLQ (“[A] hard look and update of mergers and acquisitions policy is one of 
many actions needed to preserve the life cycle of competition that has been a 
hallmark of the Internet.”). 
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possible and actual conflicts between DOJ and the FTC reduce 
certainty. 
Third, a unified approach to antitrust has become more 
important because the antitrust issues affecting tech are 
particularly complex; it is difficult to determine how best to 
apply antitrust law to emerging technologies.62 This challenge 
makes it more likely that DOJ and the FTC will proceed on 
different theories, increasing uncertainty. For instance, 
antitrust scholars and regulators have struggled to apply the 
traditional small but significant non-transitory increase in 
prices (SSNIP) test to zero-price tech markets.63 The SSNIP 
test, used by both the FTC and DOJ, defines a relevant antitrust 
market as the “smallest grouping of products for which a 
hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a 5% price 
increase.”64 However, many technology platforms offer their 
products at no monetary cost to customers. The lack of 
measurable price renders the SSNIP test difficult to 
operationalize.65 This complexity makes it more likely that the 
DOJ and the FTC will apply the test differently, resulting in 
uneven and unfair outcomes. SSNIP is only one of many areas 
of debate regarding how antitrust is to be applied to technology.  
Technology has raised questions regarding whether 
increased prices or decreased output is still a viable measure of 
monopoly. As an example, Facebook has not raised prices or 
restricted output since its founding, despite plausible claims 
that it dominates social media.66 While dominant platform 
 
 62. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 63. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49, 49 (2016) (“[D]espite the critical role that [zero-price] 
markets now play in modern economies, the antitrust enterprise has largely 
failed to account for their unique attributes.”). 
 64. FREEMAN & SYKES, supra note 45, at 5–6. 
 65. See id. at 6 (“The difficulty with applying the SSNIP test to such 
markets is clear . . . there is no sound way to analyze a 5% increase in a price 
of zero because such an increase would result in a price that remains zero.” 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 66. See Tyler Cowen, Breaking Up Facebook Would Be a Big Mistake, 
SLATE (June 13, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://perma.cc/LW3W-2LGN (“It is 
commonly alleged that Facebook has a monopoly on social networking, yet 
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companies like Amazon have been accused of levying monopoly 
power,67 others claim that platform giants and their house 
brands actually keep prices low.68 
Even defining the market of technology companies raises 
novel conundrums. To illustrate, Google has a very large share 
in the market for horizontal search (searches across the 
internet), but not in general search: users often turn to 
specialized websites, such as eBay or Amazon, for product 
searches.69 Even if horizontal search is the defining market, 
Google’s large share does not necessarily beget monopoly power. 
Consumers can easily switch between search engines and spend 
most of their time on websites, which compete with search 
engines for advertising revenue.70 Addressing these complex 
 
unlike traditional villainous monopolists, Facebook has not raised prices—the 
service is free—or restricted output.”). 
 67. Dana Mattioli, Amazon Scooped Up Data from Its Own Sellers to 
Launch Competing Products, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2020, 9:51 PM), 
https://perma.cc/B5VV-U8C6 (“Amazon.com Inc. employees have used data 
about independent sellers on the company’s platform to develop competing 
products, a practice at odds with the company’s stated policies.”); Kim 
Hyun-bin, Naver Under Fire for Unfair Marketing Practices, KOREA TIMES 
(May 27, 2020, 7:12 PM), https://perma.cc/M3MD-9K5Z (“Naver, the country’s 
leading internet portal, is once again drawing negative attention for trying to 
sneak in advertisements to enhance benefits for its paid members, which 
many critics claim is an abuse of its dominant market power.”). 
 68. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust 
Proposals, REGUL. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/SX4B-5PWP (“House 
brands such as AmazonBasics allow customers to avoid paying high prices for 
the trademarks of other large companies. And when house brands are sold in 
competition with branded goods, as they are on Amazon, they also force name 
brands to cut their own prices.”).  
 69. See Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty 
to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 293 (2013) (“Users who are 
interested in a specific category of content can, and often do, turn to specialized 
websites for information, bypassing general search engines. Studies show that 
search on these specialized sites, which include Amazon, eBay, and Facebook, 
now accounts for over one-third of all web searches.”). 
 70. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of 
Antitrust: The Case against the Case against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 171, 195 (2011) (“‘Over 60% of search engine visitors use at least two 
different search engines,’ meaning, as Google so often asserts, that 
competition really is ‘just a click away’ for a significant number of users.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
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issues requires careful coordination between the DOJ and FTC, 
which based on the agencies’ histories, is difficult at best and 
unachievable at worst.  
Mergers between platforms and nascent technologies also 
raise new questions.71 On the one hand, some worry that such 
mergers and acquisitions will entrench the monopoly power of 
the platform.72 Preventing such mergers could enable nascent 
technologies to develop into strong competitors, diversifying the 
landscape and increasing consumer choice. For instance, some 
believe that Instagram, acquired by Facebook, might have 
become a strong competitor in social media.73 Many 
quintessential U.S. tech companies, such as Intel, Apple, 
Google, and Netflix, had their beginnings as small start-ups.74 
On the other hand, the possibility of profitable acquisitions 
may be increasing innovation by incentivizing a greater number 
of start-ups. To reach a large market and grow quickly, 
start-ups typically require funding from external investors.75 
 
 71. See Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining 
Acquisitions of Nascent or Potential Competitors by Digital Platforms: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Pol’y, and Consumer Rts. of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 7 (2019) (statement of Professor 
John M. Yun, Director, Economic Education at the Global Antitrust Institute) 
(“Clearly, the acquisition of a potential or nascent competitor can result in an 
outcome that is harmful to consumers and innovation, yet it can also result in 
an outcome that unlocks a great deal of consumer value.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Megan Browdie et al., United States: Technology Mergers, 
GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Sept. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/6ZN7-6QWJ 
(expressing concern about acquisitions of nascent competitors in platform 
industries because “these markets are prone to tipping, and with tipping 
comes the potential for durable market power and substantial barriers to 
entry”). 
 73. See, e.g., Makena Kelly, Facebook’s Messaging Merger Leaves 
Lawmakers Questioning the Company’s Power, VERGE (Jan. 28, 2019, 12:47 
PM), https://perma.cc/7CGB-CMSM (“If Facebook were to come under real 
scrutiny by antitrust regulators, Instagram and WhatsApp would likely be 
their first two targets.”).  
 74. Richard Florida, America Is Losing Its Edge for Startups, BLOOMBERG 
CITYLAB (Oct. 9, 2018, 12:55 PM), https://perma.cc/7KZU-39ZF. 
 75. See Should You Pursue Funding for Your Startup?, STARTUP 
DECISIONS, https://perma.cc/D3WB-PBZV (“External funding is most often 
used by high growth startups . . . that will scale rapidly or that need to acquire 
equipment, personnel, intellectual property or other assets quickly. High 
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Start-ups are inherently risky endeavors, and the prospect of 
acquisition drives investment.76 Today, start-up funding largely 
hinges on the acquisition potential of the start-up: that is, how 
likely it is that the start-up will be acquired by a Big Tech 
incumbent and result in a payday for investors.77 Antitrust 
regulation of mergers and acquisitions thus determines 
investment behavior that is central to the tech economy: the 
current dual system, with its inefficiencies and uncertainties, 
does not suffice.  
Large technology platform companies engage heavily in 
R&D and promote consumer choice.78 Preventing their growth 
via acquisitions could decrease those benefits.79 Some argue that 
acquisitions actually allow companies to offer more options on 
the marketplace.80 As an example, they note that Facebook is 
able to provide an ad-free service in its acquired texting service 
WhatsApp due to ad revenue that Facebook receives from its 
other offerings.81 Otherwise, consumers might not have an 
ad-free choice. 
 Even the basic antitrust concern about monopoly has been 
seen by some as not well taken. Critics of breaking up Big Tech 
 
growth startups . . . use this funding to establish themselves before 
competitors enter the market.”). 
 76. See MAURITS DOLMANS & TOBIAS PESCH, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & 
HAMILTON LLP, SHOULD WE DISRUPT ANTITRUST LAW? 8, https://perma.cc
/7FTK-U8RD (PDF) (“It could be counterproductive to make buying startups 
prohibitively difficult. The prospect of being bought out is an important 
incentive for startups. The potential for acquisition drives venture capital 
firms to invest. This is the fuel that fires startups.”). 
 77. See Falcon, supra note 61 (“[H]ow attractive your company is to a big 
tech acquisition is now arguably the primary reason a startup gets funded.”). 
 78. See DOLMANS & PESCH, supra note 76, at 5 (“[L]arge platforms engage 
heavily in R&D and release new features constantly.”). 
 79. See id. (“If we [threaten to] break them up, we reduce incentives to 
keep innovating.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 66 (noting that Google and Facebook 
“allow small and midsize businesses to engage in targeted advertising, and 
therefore to offer niche products that compete against the goods and services 
of larger companies”). 
 81. See id. (“An independent WhatsApp, once placed under the pressure 
to bring in more revenue and make profits as a solo enterprise, would acquire 
more of the features Facebook critics find objectionable.”).  
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argue that the rapid pace of change in high tech makes antitrust 
enforcement counterproductive.82 While a company may own a 
monopoly in one technology, that technology may be quickly 
overturned. Soon after the government poured resources into 
the DOJ’s 2011 suit against Microsoft, revolutions in computing 
rendered the browser technology at the center of the case 
irrelevant.83 As noted below,84 given that technology companies 
are often potential competitors with one another, it would be 
intolerable to force them to live under different legal regimes. 
But given the difficulties of the issues involved and dual 
enforcement, that prospect is entirely possible. 
To be sure, some might argue that two enforcement 
agencies provide advantages, precisely because the issues 
raised by technology are hard. When agencies disagree, courts 
can ultimately settle on the views that best comport with the 
law. But any such claim faces powerful counterarguments. 
First, antitrust is a very technical area.85 Courts rely on the 
framework set by the antitrust administrative agencies more 
than in other areas of law, as evidenced by the dominance of the 
DOJ-FTC antitrust guidelines in judicial decisions.86 We cannot 
be confident that the generalist judiciary can choose correctly 
between expert agencies.  
Second, it would take a long time for the circuit courts and 
the Supreme Court to resolve fundamental conflicts between the 
agencies. Antitrust cases often take an enormously long to time 
conclude: they are the Jarndyce v. Jarndyce of modern civil 
 
 82. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Can Antitrust Keep Up?: Competition 
Policy in High-Tech Markets, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 1, 2001), https://perma.cc
/M89E-5BAR.  
 83. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). See also Sharon Pian Chan, Long Antitrust Saga Ends for Microsoft, 
SEATTLE TIMES (May 12, 2011, 7:53 AM), https://perma.cc/EFT3-7K2F 
(“Pervasive broadband has made it irrelevant whether PCs are sold with 
preinstalled copies of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. Now, anyone can 
download competing browsers . . . in a few minutes, for free.”). 
 84. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 85. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 86. See John O. McGinnis & Andrew M. Merkins, Dworkinian Antitrust, 
102 IOWA L. REV. 1, 42 n.216 (2016) (showing that more than 250 federal cases 
had relied on the antitrust merger guidelines). 
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litigation.87 In contrast, technology moves fast. By the time the 
application of the antitrust law is resolved as it affects currents 
technologies, they may well have moved on to be different in 
kind.88 During the interim, uncertainty will reign, discouraging 
economic investment.  
It might also be argued that companies will still face 
uncertainty with a single agency because antitrust enforcement 
policy can change from administration to administration. But, 
first, this uncertainty is circumscribed, occurring only at the 
change of administrations and is not the kind of continuous 
uncertainty caused by the potential and actual disagreement 
between the FTC and DOJ. Second, if antitrust enforcement 
authority is lodged in the DOJ, as we recommend, the loss in 
certainty comes with a gain in political accountability, as the 
elected president becomes responsible for the content of 
antitrust policy. No such gain occurs from disagreement 
between the DOJ and FTC. To the contrary, dual enforcement 
makes it unclear where political accountability lies.89 
Both these arguments for dual enforcement also sit 
uneasily with the structure of the rest of the administrative 
state. As we discuss below,90 one agency is generally charged 
with enforcing a single set of laws.91 The dual enforcement 
 
 87. See, e.g., GREGORY J. WERDEN & LUKE M. FROEB, ANTITRUST AND TECH: 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES DIFFER, AND IT MATTERS 1, 5 (2019) 
https://perma.cc/8Y96-3AEZ (PDF) (“Lengthy court proceedings nearly always 
preceded imposition of a contested remedy in the United States.”). 
 88. See Daniel Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Antitrust Approaches to 
Dynamically Competitive Industries in the United States and the European 
Union, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 695, 713 (2011).  
 89. See GANESH SITARAMAN, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, TAKING 
ANTITRUST AWAY FROM THE COURTS: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO REVERSING 
THE SECOND AGE OF MONOPOLY POWER 7 (2018), https://perma.cc/544N-XCWA 
(PDF) (discussing the importance of political accountability in the field of 
antitrust enforcement).  
 90. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 91. The general presumption in favor of making one agency responsible 
for a regulatory area refutes any notion that the way to respond to fear of 
agency capture is to create multiple agencies. In any event, both the Antitrust 
Division and FTC are less likely to be captured than many agencies that singly 
enforce their laws. They are “relatively well insulated from such influence by 
the need to apply objective economic principles.” Joshua D. Wright et al., 
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structure for antitrust is anomalous and its anomality has more 
costs than before, because of the need for certainty in our 
dominant technology sector.   
Regardless of the final policy decisions, addressing 
competition in the technology industry requires a well-planned, 
efficient, and cohesive approach, which can be achieved only 
under a unified antitrust enforcement agency. Creating 
uncertainty in the area has dire consequences for future 
research and development and the economy. Given their current 
performance, there can be little confidence that the FTC and 
DOJ can work together in a coordinated manner to regulate 
competition in the vital area of technology.  
2.  Technological Turf Wars 
Division between the FTC and the DOJ regarding the 
technology industry is not merely a theoretical possibility. 
Under dual enforcement, antitrust regulation of technology has 
been plagued by bureaucratic turf wars.92 Not surprisingly, both 
agencies want to take charge of the most important area in 
antitrust and are unwilling to yield control to the other. Their 
deadlock has resulted in a piecemeal investigation of the 
technology industry. In late 2020, the DOJ filed an antitrust 
suit against Google.93 Soon after, the FTC filed an antitrust suit 
against Facebook.94 The DOJ is currently investigating Apple 
 
Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster 
Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 365 (2019). Moreover, unlike many other 
agencies, important businesses both are sued and seek to sue at different 
times under the antitrust law, making it harder for businesses to form a 
unified front of influence.  
 92. See Emily Birnbaum, Antitrust Enforcers in Turf War over Big Tech, 
HILL (Sept. 17, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://perma.cc/AT88-YTPM (“The two federal 
agencies charged with investigating Big Tech are jockeying over how to divide 
up their responsibilities, setting up a messy showdown that could undermine 
the government’s efforts to take on the Silicon Valley giants.”).  
 93.  Complaint, U.S. Dept. of Just. v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 10  2020), ECF No. 1. 
  94.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Facebook for Illegal 
Monopolization, (Dec. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/4HCX-8UXG. 
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while the FTC investigates Amazon.95 This divided approach to 
antitrust regulation is illogical. Google, Apple, Facebook, and 
Amazon are competitors that rightfully should be considered 
under a coordinated investigation.  
The bifurcated investigation of Google, Apple, Facebook, 
and Amazon (the “Big Four”)96 is especially significant because 
the companies are part of what is referred to as “Big Tech.”97 Big 
Tech refers to large, dominant technology companies that are 
known for their influence, market power, and aggressive 
acquisition strategies.98 With a combined market capitalization 
of over $4 trillion,99 the “Big Five” (Google, Apple, Facebook, 
Amazon, and Microsoft) have spent billions each year on 
acquisitions, often acquiring nascent companies.100 In 2014, 
they spent a record $46 billion on 138 total acquisition deals.101  
Big Tech’s rise has not gone unnoticed. After the 2016 
presidential election, many questioned whether large tech 
platforms wield too much influence.102 In the years following, 
Big Tech has come under fire from lawmakers on both sides of 
 
 95. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23 (“Both the FTC and DOJ are 
under considerable pressure to investigate and potentially challenge a range 
of actions by a handful of companies.”). 
 96. See Big Five, PCMAG, https://perma.cc/ML7R-S6UW (“The Big Four 
are Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon (GAFA).”).   
 97. See Big Tech, PCMAG, https://perma.cc/2BZ2-J2A9 (“Big Tech refers 
to the major technology companies such as Apple, Google, Amazon and 
Facebook, which have inordinate influence.”).  
 98. See Katie Jones, The Big Five: Largest Acquisitions by Tech Company, 
VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/4J3Q-VMRV (“Given their 
financial weight, mergers and acquisitions have become a key tactic in 
maintaining their strong grip on tech supremacy.”).  
 99. See id.  
 100. See Kate Rooney, New Government Pressure Could Mean the End of 
Tech Mega Deals, CNBC (June 6, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://perma.cc/LP72-9SSB 
(noting that “Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Alphabet and their 
subsidiaries spent roughly $30 billion total on mergers and acquisitions” last 
year).  
 101. See id.  
 102. See Birnbaum, supra note 92 (“The issues came to a head in 2016, 
when it was revealed that foreign actors were able to manipulate the top social 
media platforms in the U.S. to sow discord during the presidential elections.”).  
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the political spectrum.103 In 2019, the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Antitrust opened a bipartisan “top-to-bottom” 
investigation of the tech industry, calling on tech executives to 
address allegations of anti-competitive behavior.104 In the same 
year, fifty attorneys general from U.S. states and territories 
opened an antitrust investigation of Google.105 Another coalition 
of state attorneys general announced a similar probe into 
Facebook.106 
The federal antitrust agencies attempted to mobilize to 
address the same kind of questions. However, they had to first 
agree on which agency would lead the investigation.107 Both 
 
 103. See id. (“The Washington ‘techlash’ has grabbed headlines over the 
past two years as lawmakers, government regulators and the public have 
questioned the dominance of Big Tech.”).  
 104. See Seth Fiegerman & Brian Fung, Democrats and Republicans Find 
Unity in Trashing Big Tech, CNN (July 16, 2019, 6:45 PM), https://perma.cc
/YZ2V-UDT6; see also Marcy Gordon & Barbara Ortutay, Justice Dept. Opens 
Sweeping Antitrust Investigation of Major U.S. Tech Companies, 
RealClearPolitics (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q5XC-8NTL (noting 
industry tech giants were accused of “creating a ‘startup kill zone’ to insulate 
them from competition”). In February 2021, the House Judiciary Antitrust 
Subcommittee opened another series of hearings on Big Tech, this time 
regarding proposals to curb the dominance of online platforms and modernize 
antitrust law. Press Release, House Committee on the Judiciary, House 
Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Announces Series of Hearings on Proposals 
to Curb the Dominance of Online Platforms and Modernize Antitrust Law 
(Feb. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/67YR-JERV; see Ashley Gold, House Begins 
Brewing New Tech Antitrust Laws, AXIOS (Feb. 25, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/E4DK-JLKF. Earlier that month, Amy Klobuchar, the 
incoming chairwoman of the Senate’s panel on antitrust law and competition, 
introduced a sweeping antitrust reform bill aimed at thwarting 
anticompetitive mergers. David McLaughlin & Ben Brody, Democrats Pitch 
Antitrust Revamp for ‘Too Big to Fix’ Deals, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/2H72-FMSF. 
 105. See Makena Kelly, Google under Antitrust Investigation by 50 
Attorneys General, VERGE (Sept. 9, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://perma.cc/DCD7-
99SU (“The probe, led by Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton from 
Texas, will focus primarily on Google’s advertising and search businesses. But 
in remarks given Monday, the attorneys general suggested that they may 
expand the investigation later.”). 
 106. See id.  
 107. See Birnbaum, supra note 92. According to former FTC Commissioner 
William Kovacic, “The federal agencies often vie to pursue the flashiest 
antitrust investigations of the day.” Id.  
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wanted to take the helm, which resulted in a public battle.108 In 
early 2019, the agencies negotiated a clearance arrangement 
that split up Big Tech: the DOJ would investigate Google and 
Apple while the FTC would handle Facebook and Amazon.109 
This arrangement placed not only potential but actual 
competitors under separate jurisdictions. For instance, Google 
and Facebook compete in internet advertising.110 To that point, 
a recent multistate antitrust suit alleges that Google and 
Facebook colluded to set prices for online advertisements.111 
Amazon and Apple compete in the market for smart devices.112 
The Big Four compete with each other in multiple markets 
including the Internet of Things,113 music streaming,114 
 
 108. See Baker & Hosteler LLP, Antitrust Agency Turf War Over Big Tech 
Investigations, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/DF49-5BLS.  
 109. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23. 
 110. See Amanda Lotz, ‘Big Tech’ Isn’t One Big Monopoly—It’s 5 
Companies All in Different Businesses, CONVERSATION (Mar. 23, 2018, 2:56 
PM), https://perma.cc/7HJ5-LQN5 (indicating that Google and Facebook 
dominate in internet advertising, collecting 63 percent of U.S. digital 
advertising revenue in 2017). Amazon and Facebook also compete in online 
advertising. See Taylor Soper, Amazon’s Big New Business: Here’s How Much 
Advertising Revenue the Company Generated in 2018, GEEKWIRE (Jan. 31, 
2019, 2:14 PM), https://perma.cc/ZV22-NYE2 (discussing how advertising 
drives a majority of revenue for Google and Facebook); see also Omar Oakes, 
Apple Signals Greater Role for Ad Revenue as iPhone Sales Drop 15%, 
CAMPAIGN US (Jan. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/Y7MX-25WY (“Mentioning 
advertising in a dialogue with investors is significant for Apple, which has 
prided itself in selling hardware rather than relying on ads like Google and 
Facebook.”). 
 111.  See Complaint at 5–6, State of Texas v. Google LLC, No. 40-cv-957 
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2020), ECF No. 1 (discussing the alleged agreement 
between Google and Facebook); Ryan Tracy & Jeff Horwitz, Inside the 
Google-Facebook Ad Deal at the Heart of a Price-Fixing Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/7Y7J-XMV3 (“Google gave Facebook special 
terms and access to its ad server.”). 
 112. See Cliff Saran, Apple Faces Strong Competition from Amazon, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY (Aug. 15, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://perma.cc/2KRG-TMGK 
(“There are general threats to Apple’s dominance, but the biggest shadow cast 
over Apple’s future is Amazon.”).  
 113. E.g., Facebook Portal, Apple HomePod, Amazon Alexa, and Google 
Home. 
 114. E.g., Apple Music, Google Music, and Amazon Music. 
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tablets,115 shopping platforms,116 photo platforms,117 and 
self-driving cars.118 Because of their intertwined markets, all of 
Big Tech should face a comprehensive investigation by a single 
agency. Instead, the FTC and DOJ charge a divided path on 
tech, beginning with their suits against Facebook and Google. 
Despite a relatively narrow case against Google,119 the two suits 
still overlap in subject matter, as they both address forms of 
online advertising.120 Splitting the Big Four into separate 
agency investigations introduces inconsistencies in treatment, 
gaps in information, and duplication of effort. The situation is 
exacerbated by the agencies’ divergent views towards 
intellectual property,121 national security,122 and other issues 
that affect technology. The Big Tech clearance agreement is far 
worse off than previous proposed clearance agreements, because 
prior agreements at least enabled one agency to conduct 
consistent enforcement within the industry. 
After the agencies reached this clearance agreement, the 
DOJ announced a broad antitrust review into technology giants 
in July 2019.123 Despite the FTC investigation of Facebook and 
Amazon, the DOJ suggested that Facebook and Amazon were in 
 
 115. E.g., Amazon tablet, iPad, and Google Nexus. 
 116. E.g., Amazon shopping, Google shopping, and Facebook marketplace. 
 117. E.g., Google photos, Amazon photos, iCloud, and Facebook albums. 
 118. E.g., Apple, Waymo (under Alphabet), and Amazon are all engaged in 
self-driving cars.  
 119.  See Katie Benner & Cecilia Kang, Justice Dept. Plans to File Antitrust 
Charges Against Google in Coming Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/4Z7X-KU23 (stating that several state attorneys viewed the 
DOJ’s suit against Google as too narrow to support).  
 120.  See Complaint at 2, U.S. Dept. of Just. v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-0310 
(D.D.C. Oct. 20 2020), ECF No. 1 (alleging that Google maintained monopolies 
in online advertising); Complaint at 2, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-cv-03590 
(D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020), ECF No. 3 (alleging that Facebook “monetizes its 
personal social networking monopoly principally by selling advertising”).  
 121. See infra Part I.A.3.  
 122. See infra Part II.A.  
 123. See David McLaughlin et al., Trump DOJ Escalates Big Tech Scrutiny 
with New Antitrust Probe, BLOOMBERG L. (July 23, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://
perma.cc/B8EW-ASLQ (“The department’s antitrust division disclosed plans 
July 23 to scrutinize tech platforms following mounting criticism across 
Washington that the companies have become too big and too powerful.”). 
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its sights as well.124 The negotiated division did not seem to be 
holding up. After discussion, the agencies resolved that the DOJ 
and FTC would both pursue Facebook but in regards to different 
issues, in order to avoid overlap.125 Nevertheless, disagreements 
regarding the clearance agreement arose again. In September 
of 2019, FTC Chairman Joe Simons wrote a letter to the DOJ 
raising complaints about the Department’s behavior.126 
Industry observers have also questioned the overlap between 
the agencies.127 While turf wars between the two antitrust 
agencies are not new, they reached a new high over the 
regulation of the Big Five.128 The heads of both the FTC and 
DOJ Antitrust Division admitted to the Senate that any 
clearance agreements had broken down and that “squabbles” 
between the agencies had wasted time.129 
Senators were understandably concerned that the 
infighting between the agencies thwarts regulation of Big Tech 
 
 124. See id.  
 125. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23 (“A turf battle over 
government scrutiny of Facebook is a key point of contention . . . .”).  
 126. See id. (“The previously undisclosed letter, signed by FTC Chairman 
Joseph Simons, raises the prospect that a longstanding power-sharing 
agreement between the agencies is fraying.”).  
 127. See Diane Bartz, U.S. Justice Department to Open Facebook Antitrust 
Investigation: Source, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2019, 7:52 PM), https://perma.cc
/3DQQ-ME5S; see also McKinnon & Grimaldi, supra note 40 
“For the outside observer, such internecine warfare can only 
undermine confidence in the agencies and lead to public distrust,” 
said Andrew Gavil, a Howard University antitrust law professor. 
“It will also needlessly complicate any investigations and leave the 
wider technology community guessing as to where the line is 
between lawful and unlawful business strategies.” 
 128. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23 (“While [the DOJ and FTC] 
have at times been rivals and engaged in turf battles, employees in both 
agencies acknowledge that their interactions lately have become abnormally 
strained.”).  
 129. See Lauren Feiner, Here’s Why the Top Two Antitrust Enforcers in the 
US Are Squabbling over Who Gets to Regulate Big Tech, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2019, 
10:31 AM), https://perma.cc/82KR-337B (“While both agency officials said they 
continue to stick by clearance agreements that prevent overlapping probes, 
they admitted there had also been some tension over the agreement at 
times.”). 
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at a time when it is greatly needed.130 House lawmakers 
criticized the agencies for not challenging mergers involving the 
Big Four, with one representative calling the agencies 
“paralyzed.”131 Congress did not hold back in noting the severe 
inefficiencies of the current dual system.132 By the time the DOJ 
filed suit against Google in October 2020, a Congressman called 
it “long overdue.”133 Critics noted that the delay had given 
Facebook years to prepare for an antitrust suit, and the 
company had in fact taken steps in that time to integrate its 
technologies and deter an easy breakup.134  
The FTC and DOJ are currently trying to evaluate previous 
mergers involving the tech giants for their effect on competition. 
In February 2020, the FTC issued Special Orders to the Big 
Five, requiring them to provide information about prior 
acquisitions not reported to the antitrust agencies.135 The study 
could result in the unwinding of acquisitions made over the past 
ten years.136 However, “unscrambling of the eggs” of 
already-completed acquisition is difficult and potentially 
ineffective.137 Coordinated action under a single agency might 
 
 130. See id.  
 131. Cristiano Lima, House Antitrust Chair Suggests Halting Major Tech 
Mergers Until Federal Probes Wrap, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2019, 5:57 PM), https://
perma.cc/Q7AF-EV82. 
 132. See id. (“House lawmakers grilled [high ranking officials at the FTC 
and DOJ] over concerns that they have done little to challenge mergers by 
Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple.”).  
 133.  Michael Balsamo & Marcy Gordon, Justice Dept. Files Landmark 
Antitrust Case Against Google, PBS (Oct. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/M79A-
8677. 
 134.  See Brian Fung, Facebook Must Be Broken up, the US Government 
Says in a Groundbreaking Lawsuit, CNN (Dec. 10, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/6QPZ-8URA (noting that Facebook “moved to tightly 
integrate its apps on a technical level”). 
 135. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions 
by Large Technology Companies, (Feb. 11, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc/FL82-
V63H. 
 136. Emily Birnbaum, FTC to Review Past Acquisitions by Tech Firms, 
HILL (Feb. 11, 2020, 12:27 PM), https://perma.cc/TW9Y-SHQB. 
 137. See Mergers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/U42B-ETYQ 
(noting that premerger notification requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
are intended to avoid a situation in which a merger has to be reversed).  
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well have produced timely action and simpler resolutions 
regarding these tech mergers.  
3.  Standard-Essential Patents: A Case Study in Incoherence 
 Turf battles aside, the FTC and the DOJ have promoted 
directly opposing policies regarding the application of antitrust 
law to technology.138 The contentious disagreement on the 
important issue of standard-essential patents shows the 
divergent treatment and uncertainty already generated by dual 
enforcement. The FTC believes violation of a SEP licensing 
agreement is potentially an antitrust violation.139 
Standard-setting organizations often require patent holders to 
license SEPs for free or on fair, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.140 The FTC argues that a 
violation of these licensing terms can violate antitrust laws by 
enabling a patent holder to “parlay the standardization of its 
technology into a monopoly in standard-compliant products.”141 
 
 138. See infra Part I.B.  
 139. See Timothy Syrett, The FTC’s Qualcomm Case Reveals Concerning 
Divide with DOJ on Patent Hold-Up, IPWATCHDOG (June 28, 2019), https://
perma.cc/C8MU-ZKZF (discussing the DOJ and FTC’s divergent treatment of 
SEPs).  
 140. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL NAT’L ACADS., PATENT CHALLENGES FOR 
STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 51 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 
2013). 
 141. See Complaint at 49, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 17-cv-00220)  
Once a standard incorporating proprietary technology is adopted, 
the potential exists for opportunistic patent holders to insist on 
patent licensing terms that capture not just the value of the 
underlying technology, but also the value of standardization itself. 
To address this “hold-up” risk, [standard setting organizations] 
often require patent holders to disclose their patents and commit to 
license standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) on fair, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. Absent such requirements, a 
patent holder might be able to parlay the standardization of its 
technology into a monopoly in standard-compliant products. 
See also STANDARDS, LICENSING, AND INNOVATION: A RESPONSE TO DOJ AAG’S 
COMMENTS ON ANTITRUST LAW AND STANDARD-SETTING, FED. TRADE COMM’N 21, 
https://perma.cc/M3CA-TM7Y (PDF) (“[W]hen companies promise through 
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The DOJ disagrees, because it believes “it is not the duty or the 
proper role of antitrust law to referee what unilateral behavior 
is reasonable for patent holders in this context.”142 The DOJ 
argues that patent holders enjoy a government-granted 
monopoly over the item under patent.143 Thus, a violation of a 
SEP licensing agreement may raise an issue of contract law or 
other common law right, but not antitrust.144  
SEPs are vital to technological innovation and economic 
growth, with billions of dollars at stake.145 To understand the 
importance of SEPs to technology, one must first understand the 
importance of a standard. A standard is a uniform practice 
around which a technology develops.146 For example, a standard 
could describe a specific design of a charging port. Once the 
standard is set, multiple devices, from cell phones to speakers, 
can be designed to work with that standard charging port. 
Standards enable uniformity and operability across 
 
their FRAND commitments not to exercise the market power they gained from 
incorporation of their patents into standards but then breach those 
commitments, they are exercising market power they acquired by promising 
to forgo that exercise.”). 
 142. Makin Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Just., Remarks at 
the USC Gould School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business 
Conference (Nov. 10, 2017) [hereinafter USC Speech], https://perma.cc/DNF9-
8RZS (last updated Nov. 14, 2017). 
 143. See id. (“Patents are a form of property, and the right to exclude is 
one of the most fundamental bargaining rights a property owner possesses.”).  
 144. See id.  
If a patent holder is alleged to have violated a commitment to a 
standard setting organization, that action may have some impact 
on competition. But, I respectfully submit, that does not mean the 
heavy hand of antitrust necessarily is the appropriate remedy for 
the would-be licensee—or the enforcement agency. There are 
perfectly adequate and more appropriate common law and 
statutory remedies available to the SSO or its members. 
 145. Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential Are 
Standard-Essential Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 607 (2019).  
 146. See CHARLES M. SCHMIDT, BEST PRACTICES FOR TECHNICAL STANDARD 
CREATION, MITRE 1 (Apr. 2017), https://perma.cc/Y4WK-XNWB (PDF) 
(“Technical standards support the unification of practice with regard to some 
technical activity through a precise description of that activity.”). 
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manufacturers, devices, or platforms.147 We interact with and 
depend on countless technology standards such as USB, 
Bluetooth, HTML, and 3G in our everyday life. Their 
importance cannot be overstated: they provide the foundation 
for the development and implementation of technology.148  
Despite their benefits, standards also present a dilemma: 
they are most beneficial when there is widespread adoption.149 
But most entities, from companies to countries, want to have 
their own individual designs become standard so as to gain a 
competitive advantage.150 Thus, there must be some process 
 
 147. See id. (“Uniformity of practice allows defenders to concentrate their 
efforts on a small number of defensive products and tools that then are able to 
protect multiple types of devices, applications, and functional roles within the 
enterprise.”).  
 148. See Understanding How Technical Standards Are Made & 
Maintained, IEEE, https://perma.cc/2ZXS-93AK (“Standards are used by 
people around the world, in various industries and professions. From 
healthcare, to education, energy, construction, environment, technology and 
more, published specifications and procedures help maximize the reliability of 
materials, products, methods, and services.”).  
 149. Standards facilitate the interoperability of products and services, so 
their usefulness increases with the number of adopters due to network effects. 
See Neil Gandal, Compatibility, Standardization, and Network Effects: Some 
Policy Implications, 18 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 80, 81 (2002) (“Because of 
the network effects that are inherent in [the high-tech consumer electronic 
products industry], successful diffusion of these [electronic] products is often 
contingent on a single product winning a battle of market standards or firms 
achieving compatibility among competing standards.”); see also Robert L. 
Mallett, Why Standards Matter, 15 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 63, 63 (1999) 
(“Divergent standards peculiar to a nation or region, complex conformity 
assessment requirements, and a thicket of other standards-related barriers 
have been estimated to impede the sale of an additional $20 billion to $40 
billion worth of U.S. goods and services.”). 
 150. See Mallett, supra note 149, at 66 (“We must act determinedly and 
intelligently to advance U.S. technologies and concepts as the basis for 
international standards.”); see also Sangin Park, Quantitative Analysis of 
Network Externalities in Competing Technologies: The VCR Case, 86 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 937, 939 (2004) (explaining the standards war between JVC’s 
VHS and Sony’s Betamax technologies for the video cassette recording (VCR) 
technology market, wherein Sony lost business to JVC and eventually 
switched to producing VHS over its own Betamax technology). 
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that encourages collaboration and consensus even among 
competitors.151  
Such collaboration is facilitated by a standards 
development organization (SDO) or standard setting 
organization (SSO), which creates, revises, and coordinates 
technical standards.152 Standards development organizations 
have rules and criteria to prevent a single interest from 
dominating the definition of a standard.153 Their rules govern 
how they approach patented technologies.154 For example, an 
SDO may require that only unpatented technologies can be 
adopted as standard. Thus, in deciding what charging port will 
be the industry standard, the SDO would reject any charging 
ports that were patented. While this is, in a sense, a 
procompetitive solution—no entity would have a monopoly over 
the standard technology that was decided upon—it is largely 
unrealistic in today’s world where most useful and current 
inventions are patented. Adopting an unpatented technology 
that is outdated as standard defeats the purpose of a standard, 
 
 151. See Patricia R. Harris, Why Standards Matter, 1 PORTAL: LIBR. & 
ACAD. 525, 526 (2001) (“Standards . . . do not emerge without costs, without 
time, without effort and contributions from the individuals and businesses 
that embrace a vision and are committed to addressing and solving a problem 
they share.”). 
 152. See Develop Standards: What Are Standards?, IEEE STANDARDS 
ASS’N, https://perma.cc/C8MM-H2QL (“Typically, each SDO is comprised of 
Boards, Committees and staff who establish and maintain the policies, 
procedures and guidelines that help ensure the integrity of the standards 
development process, and the standards that are generated as an outcome of 
this process.”).  
 153. See id. (“To build consensus through democratic means, participants 
engage in meetings, draft and review position pieces, create and review 
presentations, examine data and engage in active discussion and debate to 
resolve outstanding issues.”).  
 154. See IEE SA Standards Board: Patcom, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, 
https://perma.cc/R82X-DXBR (“[Patent Committee] provides oversight for the 
use of any patents and patent information in IEEE standards. The committee 
will review any patent information submitted to the IEEE SA to determine 
conformity with patent procedures and guidelines.”). 
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which is to facilitate the development and adoption of innovative 
technology.155  
As a result, SDOs must contend with standard-essential 
patents (SEPs), patents that are necessary for the 
implementation of a standardized technology.156 SDOs typically 
require that if a proposed standard is encumbered by patents, 
those patents must be licensed on “fair, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms to those seeking to utilize 
the technology.157 This requirement is thought to facilitate the 
adoption of the standard in the industry while providing fair 
terms to all parties involved.158 Because standards are critical 
to almost everything that touches technology, 
standard-essential patents are as well. When a patent is 
essential to a standard, there is no way to comply with the 
standard without infringing or licensing the patent.159 A dispute 
over a single SEP can prevent a company from making its 
product compatible with the internet, computers, or mobile 
devices.160 For example, a typical cellphone charging port has 
SEPs that cover every part of its design, from the electronic 
circuitry to communication protocols. Methods that enable a 
mobile phone to stay connected to a 4G/LTE network are 
 
 155. See Develop Standards, supra note 152 (“[S]tandards fuel the 
development and implementation of technologies that influence and transform 
the way we live, work and communicate.”).  
 156. See Gene Quinn, Standard Essential Patents: The Myths and 
Realities of Standard Implementation, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 4, 2019), https://
perma.cc/CE6W-M773 (“[SEPs] represent core, pioneering innovation that 
entire industries will build upon. These patents protect innovation that has 
taken extraordinary effort to achieve.”).  
 157. Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of 
Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
311, 312 (2014).  
 158. Most SDOs also require a disclosure of any standard-essential 
patents before approval of the standard. See Lorenz Brachtendorf et al., 
Approximating the Standard Essentiality of Patents—A Semantics-Based 
Analysis 3 (June 4, 2019) (draft prepared for 12th Searle Conference on 
Innovation Economics), https://perma.cc/TN9U-BB5P.   
 159. See Lemley & Simcoe, supra note 145, at 609 (“Unlike most other 
patents, when a patent is truly essential there is no way to design around it 
and still comply with the standard.”). 
 160. See id.  
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covered by a multitude of SEPs that are essential to the 4G/LTE 
standard.161 Qualcomm owns SEPs essential to widely adopted 
cellular communication standards such as CDMA and LTE.162  
A competition problem arises when, despite any agreement 
made at the time a standard was chosen, SEPs are later not 
licensed at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. 
When the owner of a SEP bars a competitor from utilizing a SEP 
and therefore a standard technology, this decision deals a huge 
blow to the competitor. The FTC believes that when a 
SEP-owner violates an agreement to license the SEP on fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, this is an 
anticompetitive action in violation of antitrust laws.163 In FTC 
v. Qualcomm,164 the FTC pursued action against Qualcomm 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act for refusing to license its SEPs 
to competitors.165 
In contrast, the DOJ has taken the stance that SEP owners 
refusing to license on FRAND terms is not an anticompetitive 
antitrust violation.166 It is simply a patent owner exercising his 
or her earned right to exclude competitors. As dictated under 
patent law doctrine, a patent owner has the right to prevent 
anyone from utilizing his or her patented technology.167 Going 
 
 161. See Your Phone, Our Technology: How Patents Make It Possible, 
ERICSSON (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/JAG7-JBZM (“It is impossible to 
manufacture 4G/LTE standard-compliant products such as smartphones or 
tablets without using technologies covered by one or more SEP.”). 
 162. See Joe Raffetto et al., FTC v. Qualcomm: Court Requires Licensing 
of Standard Essential Patents to Competitors, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 9, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/S6D6-JNLX.  
 163. See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text. 
 164.  969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).  
 165. See Raffetto et al., supra note 162 (describing the nature of the case). 
 166. See USC Speech, supra note 142 (“A patent holder cannot violate the 
antitrust laws by properly exercising the rights patents confer, such as seeking 
an injunction or refusing to license such a patent.”). 
 167. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)  
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant 
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to 
exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout 
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forward, it is uncertain whether the government will pursue 
antitrust enforcement actions related to the licensing of SEPs.168 
This disagreement between the DOJ and the FTC rippled 
out to cause concern in the legislative branch. Because of the 
DOJ’s disagreement with the FTC, Senators wrote to the DOJ 
urging the agency to clarify its policy and provide guidance to 
stakeholders.169 The uncertainty created by this bifurcated 
approach creates dissatisfaction in Congress and so undermines 
 
the United States, or importing into the United States, products 
made by that process, referring to the specification for the 
particulars thereof. 
 168. In the early 2000s, both agencies agreed that SEPs were subject to 
antitrust enforcement. See Syrett, supra note 139 (“[T]he FTC and DOJ had 
worked both in parallel and together to address the potential competitive 
harms posed by patent hold-up.”). During this period of agreement, the 
agencies issued a joint statement. See U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 3 (2007), https://perma.cc/K48Q-A4LY (PDF). In 
2007, the FTC and DOJ joint report on antitrust and intellectual property 
rights explained their position on SEPs, citing competitive harms that would 
result if FRAND commitments of SEPs were not enforced. Id. at 47. 
Specifically, the report warned that if SEPs were not required to be licensed 
at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, as were agreed upon at the 
time of the approval of the standard, the problem of patent hold-up would 
occur. Id. Patent hold-up arises when a patent owner is able to extract a higher 
royalty or concession for his or her patent than it would have warranted ex 
ante. Thomas F. Cotter et al., Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1501, 1505 07 (2019).   
  The period of harmony between the antitrust agencies regarding 
SEPs was put to an end five years later. In 2018, Makan Delrahim, the head 
of the DOJ Antitrust Division, formally withdrew the DOJ’s approval of the 
prior 2013 joint policy statement, stating that the DOJ is “committed to 
ensuring that patent holders maintain their full constitutional right to seek 
an injunction against infringement.” Memorandum from Makan Dalrahim, 
U.S. Dep’t Just., “Telegraph Road”: Incentivizing Innovation at the 
Intersection of Patent and Antitrust Law 14 (Dec. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc
/LQ4C-52Y9 (PDF). 
 169. See Norman Armstrong et al., Senators Urge DOJ to Develop 
Antitrust Guidance for Licensing of Standard Essential Patents, JD SUPRA 
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/4K9C-4MET (describing the letter as a 
“request for clarity [which] stems, in large part, to a recent shift in the DOJ’s 
position as to FRAND issues”). 
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support for these agencies among those who control their 
funding.170 
The disagreement between the DOJ and FTC has 
international implications as well. Divergence in treatment of 
FRAND agreements among countries already causes difficulties 
for companies operating under different national standards in 
the global economy.171 These international challenges are 
further exacerbated by the different policies of the two domestic 
antitrust enforcement agencies of the United States, still the 
most important commercial nation in the world.172 Companies 
are subject to potentially conflicting standards depending not 
only on the national identity of the enforcement agency but also 
on the identity of the agency with the United States. 
International harmonization becomes more difficult if the 
United States has internal disagreements. Therefore, the case 
 
 170. Cf. Leah Nylen, DOJ Seeks 71 Percent Bump from Congress for 
Antitrust, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 2020, 5:32 PM), https://perma.cc/Q7MM-XG9H 
(discussing DOJ’s budget request for a 71 percent increase in funding for the 
antitrust division). Other agencies also changed their position to align with 
DOJ, creating a split with the FTC’s policies. The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office put out a joint statement with DOJ on the subject. See U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., & U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 6 (2019), https://perma.cc
/BG6Y-QBU6 (PDF) (rejecting “a special set of legal rules that limit remedies 
for infringement of standards-essential patents subject to a F/RAND 
commitment”). The International Trade Commission, a domestic agency which 
handles many patent disputes, issued injunctive relief to a SEP owner in the 
same year. See Michael T. Renaud et al., Out with the Old, and in with the 
New: Joint Policy Statement and Recent Cases Confirm That Injunctive Relief 
on Standard-Essential Patents Is Available at the ITC, MINTZ (Dec. 23, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/U4G3-N83V.  
 171. See Patrick Wingrove, FRAND Divergence Stifles Global Licensing 
Strategies, MANAGING IP (Aug. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/9MGR-N7BK (“With 
steady divergence of what constitutes fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) terms in licenses for standard essential patents, some in-house 
counsel say the disparate treatment of IP across the world is stifling their 
global licensing strategies.”). 
 172. See Jacqueline Yin, Delrahim Out of Step With FTC, Industry, 
Academics on FRAND/SEP, PAT. PROGRESS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc
/RX62-XPGU (arguing that the DOJ’s interpretation causes international 
conflict and that the DOJ should instead follow the FTC’s approach). 
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of SEPs shows how dual enforcement has created uncertainty in 
the industry, in Congress, and internationally. 
B.  Dual Enforcement Causes Inefficiencies and Inconsistent 
Outcomes 
Technology did not create, but only exacerbates 
long-standing problems of dual antitrust enforcement. In this 
subpart we briefly offer more general arguments against joint 
enforcement by the FTC and Antitrust Division. It wastes 
resources, and even in non-technological areas, it creates 
uncertainty.173 Both waste and uncertainty are compounded by 
turf wars, as exemplified by conflicts over mergers.174  
Moreover, Congress never intended for a system of full dual 
enforcement.175 Thus, eliminating it would not undermine a 
fully deliberated scheme. Single enforcement would additionally 
bring the United States in conformity with industrialized 
nations worldwide, which generally have a single antitrust 
enforcer.176 Finally, we respond to the argument that single 
agency enforcement would not improve matters much because 
private actors can enforce antitrust.177 Private enforcers are 
subject to heavy restrictions and do not have the same ability to 
direct antitrust policy as the agencies do. 
1.  Waste and Uncertainty 
Requiring two agencies with two sets of staff to perform 
similar tasks creates costs and waste. As Ernest Gellhorn noted, 
“These costs are particularly pronounced in labor-intensive 
bureaus [such as the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division] where 
lawyers and economists are the principal resource.”178 The DOJ 
Antitrust Division requested $166.8 million from Congress in 
 
 173. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 174. See infra notes 186–188 and accompanying text. 
 175. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 176. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 177. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 178. Gellhorn, supra note 19. 
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2020 to support their 695 positions and 335 attorneys.179 In the 
same year, the FTC requested over $312 million to support 
1,140 positions.180 In total, the country spent over $470 million 
in 2019 on antitrust efforts, much of which could have been 
saved absent the dual agency structure.181 Dual enforcement 
results in duplicated efforts and unnecessary expenditures.182 
When power is diffused across multiple actors, no single actor is 
truly empowered, resulting in inefficiencies and a lack of 
accountability.183 
Additionally, the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division must 
coordinate workflow with each other.184 Such coordination 
wastes agency time that could be spent directly on 
enforcement.185 For instance, since 1938, the two agencies have 
held numerous conferences in attempts to divide and coordinate 
their responsibilities related to merger review.186 Despite minor 
improvements, the negative effects of a two-agency antitrust 
enforcement system persist. Merger clearance is still 
inconsistent and contentious between the FTC and DOJ. Its 
 
 179. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 1, https://
perma.cc/5423-E5R4 (PDF). 
 180. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION 2 (2019), https://perma.cc/NGQ8-KDY2 (PDF). 
 181. Id.; DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 179, at 3. 
 182. Blumenthal, supra note 37, at 29 30. 
 183. See SITARAMAN, supra note 89, at 8 (describing the problems that 
arise when power is diffused). 
 184. See id. at 14 (noting that the agencies must determine which agency 
has power to review a merger in each case prior to conducting the review); 
Garry A. Gabison, Dual Enforcement of Electric Utility Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 11, 34 36 (2017) (describing the problems 
under a dual enforcement system).  
 185. See SITARAMAN, supra note 89, at 14 (“In some cases, the agencies 
take up more than half of the pre-merger review time period (30 days) 
determining which agency has the power to review the merger, leaving the 
agency with little time to conduct a robust review.”). 
 186. See David L. Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the 
Department of Justice and the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 BUS. LAW. 2075, 
2077 (1976) (describing the agencies’ efforts to coordinate enforcement). 
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long history suggests that this problem will continue so long as 
two antitrust agencies exist.187 
Dual enforcement also leads to missed enforcement 
opportunities. Under § 7 of the Clayton Act,188 both agencies are 
charged with the prevention of monopolies.189 The Act prohibits 
mergers of companies that would substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly.190 In 1976, the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act)191 
was passed, which enabled the agencies to investigate mergers 
before they happened and also provided procedures for 
coordinating merger review between the agencies.192 The HSR 
Act required each antitrust agency to obtain clearance from the 
other before opening an investigation, and the Act additionally 
established time limits for the process.193 Deciding which agency 
had the go-ahead in a timely and organized manner proved 
difficult.194 Due to HSR time limits, if the agencies could not 
 
 187. Dual enforcement has rightfully been the subject of scrutiny for 
decades. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 1, at 507 (“Each aspect of U.S. antitrust 
enforcement, including dual federal jurisdiction, has received close scrutiny.”); 
Milton Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 
1319 20 (1982); Ernest Gellhorn et al., Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual 
Enforcement? A Proposal for Rationalization, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 695, 701 
(1990) (stating that dual enforcement is “inefficient and misguided”); Darren 
Bush, Out of the DOJ Ashes Rises the FTC Phoenix: How to Enhance Antitrust 
Enforcement by Eliminating an Antitrust Enforcement Agency, 53 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 33, 34 (2016). Previous criticism has not focused on the impact of 
technology, especially modern technology, on antitrust enforcement. Cf. id. at 
52 (proposing a single enforcement scheme without discussing the impact of 
technology under the current scheme or the proposal). 
 188. 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 189. See id. § 18a (vesting enforcement authority in both the FTC and the 
DOJ). 
 190. Id. § 18. 
 191. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a).  
 192. Kelly Signs, Milestones in FTC History: HSR Act Launches Effective 
Premerger Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 16, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc
/PK5Z-GFEF. 
 193. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d) (setting out premerger procedures). 
 194. See Lauren Kearney Peay, The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002 
FTC/DOJ Merger Clearance Accord, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1315 16 (2007) 
(describing the initial difficulties of resolving clearance disputes). 
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agree on which agency would conduct the investigation, both 
agencies would miss their chance to resolve possible antitrust 
violations.195 Valuable investigation time was often wasted by 
agency turf battles over clearance.196 Such battles over cases 
also undermine agency morale, further hurting agency 
efficiency.197 
In attempts to streamline the clearance process, the FTC 
and DOJ agreed to joint guidelines in 1993.198 The guidelines 
delineated which agency had expertise in different product 
areas, but clearance disputes continued to drag on: neither 
agency had the incentive to defer to the other, regardless of 
expertise.199 Another inter-agency agreement in 1995 similarly 
failed to improve matters.200 Between 1999 and 2002, one or 
both agencies sought clearance on approximately 1,250 
matters.201 On average, 24 percent of those matters resulted in 
delays of three weeks or a cumulative delay of more than 
seventeen years.202 In 2002, the agencies tried yet again, 
proposing a clearance agreement that would permanently 
divide mergers between the agencies based upon industry.203 
 
 195. See id. at 1315 (“Under the HSR Act, these investigations were 
constrained by statutorily enforced time limits. If the agencies failed to resolve 
disputes in a timely fashion, they risked missing the only window of 
opportunity for thwarting the merger before it occurred.”). 
 196. See id. at 1316 (“Clearance disputes [took up] a considerable 
percentage of the thirty-day waiting period, leaving the ‘winning’ agency with 
a truncated period of time within which to investigate . . . .”). 
 197. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
iv (2007), https://perma.cc/8SMF-Y92U (PDF) [hereinafter 2007ANTITRUST 
MODERNIZATION REPORT]. 
 198. Peay, supra note 194, at 1315. 
 199. Id. at 1316 (describing the effect of the 1993 guidelines). 
 200. Id. at 1317. 
 201. FTC Releases Antitrust Clearance Process Documents, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Feb. 27, 2002), https://perma.cc/GK7N-JA8N. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See Kris Dekeyser et al., Coordination Among National Antitrust 
Agencies, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 43, 51 (2009) (“In 2002, the DOJ and FTC 
announces the creation of a Memorandum of Agreement . . . that delineated 
the industry sectors that were to fall under each agency’s purview, and the 
divisions would be permanent.”). 
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This time, the clearance agreement was blocked by the 
Senate.204 
Clearance battles are also harmful because they create 
uncertainty. With two sets of directions, companies waste 
resources attempting to adhere to both guidelines as is 
feasible.205 For example, the agencies have different merger 
procedures:206 the FTC can pursue action through its 
administrative court, while the DOJ must litigate before Article 
III courts.207 This results in significantly unequal power in 
seeking permanent injunctions during merger investigations.208 
The FTC usually only seeks a preliminary injunction in court, 
retaining the option to pursue a permanent injunction through 
its internal administrative litigation process.209 The DOJ 
usually agrees with the merging parties to consolidate 
proceedings for preliminary and permanent injunctions, which 
forces it to meet a higher burden of proof.210 As a result, the 
outcome of a merger may turn on which antitrust agency is 
reviewing it.211 
 
 204. See id. 
 205. See Kovacic, supra note 1, at 521 (“If agencies apply dissimilar 
analytical techniques or standards, a fourth cost of competition and 
redundancy is the expense that businesses incur to evaluate commercial plans 
and strategies under both sets of enforcement approaches.”). 
 206. Blumenthal, supra note 37, at 29 30. 
 207. Gabison, supra note 184, at 24.   
 208. See id. (noting that the DOJ must meet a higher standard of proof 
than the FTC); Raymond Z. Ling, Unscrambling the Organic Eggs: The 
Growing Divergence between the DOJ and the FTC in Merger Review after 
Whole Foods, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 938 (2010) (“[T]he FTC’s lower 
preliminary injunction standard and its ability to commence administrative 
litigation gives the FTC a significant advantage over the DOJ in challenging 
a merger and extracting a settlement, a result that is unacceptable in a dual 
enforcement system.”). 
 209. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 197, at 138 
(stating that the FTC has “statutory authority to secure permanent relief 
through administrative litigation, an avenue not available to the DOJ”). 
 210. See id. at 139. While the House in 2018 passed legislation aimed at 
eliminating this inequality, the bill was never passed by the Senate. See H.R. 
5645 (115th): Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules 
Act of 2018, GOVTRACK, https://perma.cc/FY9Z-DVGY.  
 211. See Ling, supra note 208, at 938. 
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Even when the agencies follow the same procedures, they 
apply them differently, leading to different results based on 
which agency handles the case212 and creating inconsistencies 
in the enforcement of the law.213 At times, one agency approves 
conduct that the other agency rejects.214 For example, DOJ 
leadership under the Trump administration is skeptical of 
behavioral remedies in vertical mergers, while the FTC has 
continued to apply behavioral remedies when approving vertical 
mergers.215 Thus, conflicts between the FTC and DOJ even 
outside the technology context persist to the present day.216  
 
 212. See Blumenthal, supra note 37, at 30 (stating that disparate outcomes 
result from differing views about the application of substantive antitrust law). 
 213. SITARAMAN, supra note 89, at 7. 
 214. See Handler, supra note 187, at 1319; see also FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 
411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 683 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding for the FTC, which alleged 
that Qualcomm’s conduct violated antitrust laws, despite the DOJ’s approval 
of Qualcomm’s conduct).  
 215. See Browdie et al., supra note 72, at 77. Behavioral or conduct 
remedies allow mergers to proceed subject to specified behavioral 
commitments, such as non-discrimination provisions, mandatory licensing, 
anti-retaliation provisions, or prohibitions on certain contracting practices. 
U.S. DEP’T JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 13 
(2011), https://perma.cc/6BQ7-T4PM (PDF); John E. Kowka & Diana L. Moss, 
Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust 
Enforcement, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 4 (2011), https://perma.cc/G7LD-PWU7 
(PDF). In contrast, structural remedies typically require divestiture of a 
business entity or assets, which enables the divested entity to act as an 
independent firm. See id. at 4–6 (comparing structural remedies to behavioral 
remedies). 
 216. As recently as May 2020, economists, legal scholars, and practitioners 
submitted a joint letter to Congress, calling on the legislature to help solve 
inefficiencies caused by the country’s unique system of antitrust enforcement. 
See JOINT SUBMISSION OF ANTITRUST ECONOMISTS, LEGAL SCHOLARS, AND 
PRACTITIONERS TO THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON THE STATE OF 
ANTITRUST LAW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PROTECTING COMPETITION IN DIGITAL 
MARKETS 13 (May 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/2QN4-JJP3 (PDF) (“Congress 
could enhance enforcement efficiency and efficacy by harmonizing the 
agencies’ procedures and by clearly articulating their respective 
responsibilities . . . .”). 
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2.  The Accidental Origins of Dual Enforcement 
Creating a unified antitrust enforcement agency would not 
reverse a fully deliberated decision of Congress: to the contrary, 
it would right an accidental duplication that was not 
anticipated.217 As Jason Marisam has noted, “[D]uplicative 
delegations are largely incidental and unintentional 
creations.”218 The overlapping jurisdiction between the DOJ 
Antitrust Division and the FTC is no exception. The agencies 
were never intended to serve the same role as antitrust 
enforcers.219 
The Department of Justice’s antitrust enforcement began in 
1903, when Congress earmarked money for antitrust 
enforcement and created the Antitrust Attorney General 
position.220 In the same year, President Roosevelt created the 
Bureau of Corporations, the FTC’s predecessor.221 The DOJ was 
the prime litigator in antitrust cases and sought to enforce the 
Sherman Act222 which was passed by Congress to address 
antitrust concerns.223 However, the results varied widely from 
court to court, with the judiciary placing much of the power in 
their own hands.224 Congress was not pleased with these judicial 
 
 217. See Harry First et al., Procedural and Institutional Norms in 
Antitrust Enforcement: The U.S. System 3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L., Working 
Paper No. 12-18, 2012) (stating that Congress did not anticipate the two 
agencies to have “overlapping enforcement authority”).   
 218. Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184 
(2011). 
 219. See First et al., supra note 217, at 3 (“At the time the statutes were 
enacted . . . Congress apparently saw the two agencies as focusing on 
competition problems in different ways and using different procedures.”). 
 220. Gregory J. Werden, Establishment of the Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 419, 424 25 (2018). The DOJ 
Antitrust Division was formally established a few years later in 1919. Id. at 
425 26. 
 221. Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/9U86-QX6M. 
 222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 38. 
 223. See First et al., supra note 217, at 3 (stating that Congress anticipated 
the DOJ to continue litigating antitrust cases while the FTC engaged in 
“preventative regulation”). 
 224. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) 
(establishing the Rule of Reason); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair 
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interpretations and sought to create a commission to carry out 
their original vision.225 They created the Federal Trade 
Commission in 1914 in an attempt to cut down on the 
divergences between courts and to shift control over antitrust 
policy away from the courts.226 Ironically, the creation of the 
FTC and subsequent overlapping jurisdiction has divided 
executive authority. 
At the time of the FTC’s creation, Congress believed the 
DOJ and FTC would take on different roles in antitrust law. 
Most fundamentally, they believed the DOJ would enforce 
antitrust against those who violated the law while the FTC 
would regulate the behavior of corporations, preventing 
monopolies from occurring in the first place.227 Congress, 
however, failed to expressly differentiate the roles that it 
intended the agencies to play.228 When the FTC Act was passed, 
the agency had broad powers that intersected with those of the 
DOJ. Crucially, the two agencies have concurrent authority over 
§§ 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act.229 
These statutes are significant and cover everything from 
mergers and civil nonmerger investigations to noncriminal 
pricing conspiracies.230 It is under this shared authority that 
 
Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 
B.C. L. REV. 227, 233 (1980). 
 225. See First et al., supra note 217, at 2 3 (discussing the congressional 
response to Standard Oil); Averitt, supra note 224, at 233 (same). 
 226. See Averitt, supra note 224, at 233 36 (describing the Congressional 
effort to wrest control from the courts); Our History, supra note 221. 
 227. First et al., supra note 217, at 3 (describing the DOJ’s intended role 
as handling existing monopolies and the FTC’s role as engaging in 
“preventative regulation”). 
 228. See id. (“Congress paid no attention to the potential for conflict 
between the agencies.”). 
 229. U.S. DEP’T JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL VII-3 (5th ed. 2012) 
https://perma.cc/5MVP-R2JF (PDF) [hereinafter DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION 
MANUAl]; see The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/JS77-
ME9Q (stating that while the FTC does not have direct jurisdiction over the 
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has ruled that violations of the Sherman Act 
also violate the FTC Act).  
 230. First et al., supra note 217, at 3. It is true that the agencies have some 
differences in jurisdiction. For example, the DOJ exclusively handles criminal 
antitrust cases and the FTC exclusively handles civil Robinson-Patman Act 
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many conflicts have arisen, culminating in the far-reaching 
conflicts brought on by our technological age. Consolidating 
enforcement would eliminate much duplication that Congress 
never intended.   
3.  Worldwide Trend of Single Enforcement 
Other countries that had similar overlapping jurisdiction 
problems in antitrust enforcement have recently consolidated 
enforcement into a single agency, making the dual enforcement 
in the United States even more anomalous. For example, Brazil 
restructured its own dispersed competition authorities into a 
single agency in 2011.231 In 2018, China passed legislation to 
amalgamate its three antitrust bodies into one.232 The United 
States is no stranger to consolidation of competition law itself. 
In 1989, regulation of mergers in the trucking and airline 
industries was moved from the Department of Transportation 
to the DOJ Antitrust Division.233 Creating a single enforcement 
agency for antitrust would thus be consonant with both 
international and domestic trends. 
4.  Private Antitrust Suits Do Not Support Continued Dual 
Agency Enforcement 
To be sure, removing the FTC’s antitrust jurisdiction would 
not prevent private antitrust suits. The Sherman and Clayton 
Acts provide a private right of action.234 For every antitrust case 
 
matters, which are related to price discrimination. DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION 
MANUAL, supra note 222, at VII-3. 
 231. See Tito Amaral de Andrade et al., Brazil: Merger Control, GLOB. 
COMPETITION REV. (Sept. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/EN83-ZHQZ (describing 
the restructuring legislation as some of the most important governance over 
merger review in Brazil); Spencer Weber Waller, The Omega Man or the 
Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law, 52 CONN. L. REV. 123, 178 (2020) (comparing 
the dual system in the United States with the single agency systems in Brazil). 
 232. Noah A. Brumfield et al., China Merges Antitrust Enforcement 
Agencies into One, as Its Anti-Monopoly Law Approaches 10th Anniversary, 
WHITE & CASE LLP (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/J94K-ZB7R. 
 233. Gabison, supra note 184, at 37. 
 234. See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 51 (2011) (stating that the private right of action was likely 
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brought by the FTC or DOJ, there are about ten cases brought 
by private actors.235 Private antitrust litigation is often 
motivated by business objectives, with companies strategically 
filing suit against rivals.236 These private actions may be 
uncoordinated with the country’s domestic policy interests, 
causing headaches for the government. For example, a private 
antitrust litigant has the right to bring an action against a 
foreign defendant, even if the foreign defendant’s behavior was 
permitted by foreign law.237   
That said, the existence of private litigants is not a strong 
argument against consolidating the DOJ and the FTC. 
Deadlocks and disorganization at the federal agency level are 
much more problematic than any unpredictability resulting 
from private action. The FTC and DOJ are repeat actors with 
institutional knowledge and large staffs devoted to bringing 
antitrust cases.238 Repeat actors in an area of law have outsize 
power to shape it, because they can make strategic and 
long-term litigation decisions to shape the rules to their 
advantage.239 And no antitrust plaintiff is as much a repeat 
player in antitrust as the Department of Justice and the FTC. 
In a technical area like antitrust,240 the professional staffs of the 
 
intended to be “a supplement to public enforcement,” but it is exercised more 
often than framers of the Acts likely imagined). 
 235. See id. at 63. 
 236. See id. at 50.  
 237. Hannah Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: 
Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 219, 225 (2001). A private litigant is vested “with the power to assert 
domestic policy even in situations in which a government agency, considering 
the international implications of such an action, might decline to do so.” Id. at 
237. 
 238. See supra notes 178–180 and accompanying text. 
 239. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 112 (1974).  
 240. See William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex 
Post Assessments of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition 
Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843, 850 (2001) (“To a degree unmatched in other 
fields of economic regulation, the elaboration of antitrust doctrine draws upon 
the contributions of economic theory.”). 
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agencies can influence courts to a far greater degree.241 The 
reach of these agencies is not limited to the cases they bring. 
The agencies also file amicus briefs, and these can be very 
influential.242  
Moreover, private antitrust action is limited by many 
constraints not imposed on federal agencies. For example, 
private plaintiffs must prove a personal injury in antitrust 
suits.243 This standing requirement proves an obstacle in 
challenging mergers: plaintiffs must not only prove that the 
merger is anticompetitive, but also that the post-merger firm 
would do something anticompetitive that harms them 
personally.244 To bring suit under a theory of monopolization, a 
private litigant must be a direct purchaser of the alleged 
monopolist to have standing.245 In the realm of international 
affairs, forum selection and choice of law clauses and the rise of 
arbitration provide a barrier to private antitrust action.246 The 
antitrust agencies have significantly more power in antitrust 
law than private litigants. It is important that this power is 
wielded in a unified and orderly way.  
 
 241. See, e.g., id. at 853–54 (stating that the FTC’s professional staff 
conducts studies to evaluate the agency’s past enforcement decisions). 
 242. See Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 
625, 628 (2001) (discussing the influence of DOJ and FTC amicus briefs).  
 243. Dan Butrymowicz, Antitrust Violation vs. Injury-in-Fact: A Distinction 
That Makes a Difference, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 26, 2016, 11:16 AM), https://
perma.cc/GY4Z-P2S2. 
 244. Paul F. Brzyski, Collateral Damage: Private Merger Lawsuits in the 
Wake of Section 2’s Contraction, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 119, 132 (2019). 
 245. See Case Comment, Clayton Antitrust Act and Sherman Antitrust 
Act—Antitrust Trade and Regulation—Antitrust Standing—Apple Inc. v. 
Pepper, 133 HARV. L. REV. 382, 382 (2019) (“Indirect purchasers, who 
transacted with these direct purchasers rather than with the monopolist itself, 
had no standing, even if the direct purchaser ‘passed on’ the full cost of the 
monopolistic overcharge in the form of higher prices.”). 
 246. See Buxbaum, supra note 237, at 237–45 (examining the role of 
foreign arbitration and choice-of-law clauses in domestic regulatory cases). 
 
352 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2021) 
 
II.  ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED 
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
With the understanding that dual enforcement cannot 
continue, this Part explains why antitrust enforcement is best 
placed under the DOJ’s Antitrust Division. We first show that 
the DOJ, not the FTC, should be the choice because antitrust 
now has serious foreign policy and national security 
ramifications in our technological era that must be handled by 
an agency directly responsible to the president, who controls the 
numerous other mechanisms for dealing with such issues.247 We 
next show that removing the FTC from antitrust will have the 
substantial added advantage of improving its oversight of 
privacy—a consumer protection matter also given new 
prominence by technology.   
A. Antitrust Policy Increasingly Implicates Foreign Policy 
Antitrust law has always affected foreign policy. That much 
is evident in the various international antitrust organizations 
and agreements in existence.248 Enforcement decisions, even 
those involving only domestic companies, have political and 
economic ramifications for the United States internationally.249 
 
 247. E.g., the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the State 
Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, foreign ambassadors, and 
treaties. 
 248. The International Competition Network, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and Inter-American 
Competition Alliance are some of the many international antitrust 
organizations. RANDOLPH TRITELL & ELIZABETH KRAUS, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PROGRAM 6 
(2019), https://perma.cc/7MQV-26DC (PDF). On their websites, the DOJ and 
FTC provide extensive lists of international competition and consumer 
protection agreements entered into by the United States. See generally 
International Competition and Consumer Protection Cooperation Agreements, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/SZZ8-EM9R; Antitrust Cooperation 
Agreements, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://perma.cc/ZWE7-6P9M. 
 249. See Brief for the United States of America (Dep’t of Justice) as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur at 3, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122) (arguing that an antitrust enforcement 
decision against Qualcomm, a domestic company, will shift the United States’ 
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However, antitrust law plays a particularly important role in 
international politics today due to the rise of technology. 
Technology has revolutionized foreign intelligence and 
espionage.250 Accordingly, countries have grappled for control of 
the technology industry, notably China and the United 
States,251 initiating “the technology cold war.”252 Both the 
United States and China have used antitrust regulation to 
further their position in this technology war.253 Therefore, 
technological advancement requires that antitrust enforcement 
be carefully coordinated with foreign policy.  
The executive branch, specifically the president, directs and 
controls relations with international entities.254 Thomas 
Jefferson described the president as “the only channel of 
communication between the United States and foreign 
nations.”255 Traditional descriptions of executive power by 
political writers have necessarily included foreign affairs 
 
dominance in 5G technologies and harm national security); see also David J. 
Gerber, International Competitive Harm and Domestic Antitrust Laws: Forms 
of Analysis, 10 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 41, 41 (1989). 
 250. See Edward Lucas, The Spycraft Revolution, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 27, 
2019), https://perma.cc/25BH-7NE8 (“The biggest disruptive force is 
technological.”). 
 251. See Marguerite Reardon, How 5G Got Tied Up in a Trade War 
Between Trump and China, CNET (July 15, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://perma.cc
/3GR5-5DLK  
[T]he outcome of the 5G race is likely to determine whether the US 
will continue to maintain its technological edge and shape 
geopolitics for the next couple of decades or if [it will] cede that 
control to China, which sees technological dominance as a way to 
become a world superpower. 
 252. Adam Segal, Year in Review 2019: The U.S.-China Tech Cold War 
Deepens and Expands, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.: BLOG (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/QB6W-3SQB. 
 253. See infra notes 277–299 and accompanying text. 
 254. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power 
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001). While some scholars argue 
that Congress plays a dominant role in foreign affairs, they concede that the 
president has significant foreign powers under the Constitution. Id. at 240– 41. 
 255. A Short History of the Department of State, U.S. DEP’T STATE, OFF. 
HISTORIAN, https://perma.cc/6H5V-9C4P.  
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powers.256 The Constitution specifically enumerates the 
president’s power to make treaties, appoint ambassadors, and 
control the army and navy.257 These designations enable the 
president to conduct diplomacy with foreign nations.258 The 
Supreme Court has affirmed that the president is “the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations.”259 The secretary of state, the Foreign Service, and the 
U.S. Agency for International Development report to the 
president and carry out his or her foreign policy.260 Outside of 
constitutional grants of power, as a practical matter, the 
president is generally privy to information relevant to foreign 
affairs on a more up-to-date basis than other governmental 
bodies.261 His or her constitutional power and comparative 
information advantage both place the president in a position to 
direct international relations and safeguard against foreign 
threats. Therefore, the president must directly oversee antitrust 
policy to carry out his or her constitutional foreign policy duties.  
The president has such direct oversight of the DOJ. The 
president appoints the attorney general and assistant attorneys 
 
 256. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 254, at 234 (“[T]he ordinary 
eighteenth-century meaning of executive power . . . included foreign affairs 
powers.”). 
 257. U.S. CONST. art II.  
 258. See Jonathan Masters, U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the 
President, COUNCIL FOREIGN RELS., https://perma.cc/CHY2-AL8T (last 
updated Mar. 2, 2017) (describing the implied power of conducting diplomacy 
with other countries as flowing from the express power to appoint and receive 
ambassadors). 
 259. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 
(1936). 
 260. The Secretary of State, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://perma.cc/AGV4-
Y2Q5. 
 261. See Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Toward a Broader Understanding 
of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis, 70  J. 
POL. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing that the president can use various policies and tools 
to act without congressional endorsement). 
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general 262 and retains the power to fire these agents at will.263 
The Antitrust Division has a particularly hierarchal structure 
wherein the president appoints an assistant attorney general 
who oversees the entire Antitrust Division.264 The same cannot 
be said for the FTC. The FTC is an independent agency, and 
heads of the agency can only be removed by the president for 
good cause.265 The president may exert political pressure on the 
FTC as an independent agency to take a specific action, but he 
is not able to direct the agency in the same way.266 And, since 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
independence of the FTC,267 the president has never fired any 
commissioner.268 
Under dual antitrust enforcement, the president is thus 
handicapped in his or her direction of antitrust policy. The FTC 
and DOJ jointly represent the United States in multiple 
international antitrust organizations, such as the Internal 
Competition Network269 and Competition Committee of the 
 
 262. Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T JUST., ANTITRUST DIV., https://
perma.cc/6EUD-XQBV.  
 263. That said, the DOJ traditionally operates with a degree of 
prosecutorial independence. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the 
President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 38–68 (2018). 
 264. DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 229, at I-3.  
 265. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935) 
(concluding that the president’s power to remove a head of the FTC is limited 
to the causes enumerated in the Federal Trade Commission Act). 
 266. For example, in 2011, President Obama released executive orders 
requiring agencies to conduct retrospective regulatory reviews. Independent 
agencies were not bound to these orders. Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 
3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011),  https://perma.cc/RK4E-TFGD (PDF); Exec. Order No. 
13610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/VN2H-WDC6 
(PDF). 
 267. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628 (stating that the duties of the 
FTC “are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the 
statute, must be free from executive control”). 
 268. See Commissioners, Chairwomen and Chairmen of the Federal Trade 
Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2018), https://perma.cc/32XV-5TDT (listing  
each commissioner and their term of service and stating that commissioners 
serve a seven-year term unless they resign early). 
 269. DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 229, at VII-34. 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.270 
The FTC has the power to enforce its antitrust judgments 
abroad,271 which further hinders the president’s ability to form 
cohesive international policies. Further, the FTC does not 
distinguish between its international and domestic activities.272 
After the agency determines its enforcement policies, it 
“enforces them to the fullest extent of its jurisdictional 
authority, whether foreign or domestic.”273 This could give rise 
to antitrust decisions that cut against the nation’s best interest. 
Antitrust policy is a tool in the toolbox when it comes to 
navigating a complex global economy and political landscape. It 
should be used in the context of the country’s overall 
international policies and goals. 
FTC v. Qualcomm reveals how international relations and 
national security are intertwined with antitrust policy.274 
Opposing the district court’s decision in the case successfully 
brought by the FTC, the DOJ argued that the antitrust 
enforcement action harmed Qualcomm’s ability to compete and 
so posed a serious national security threat.275 As support, the 
agency cited to statements by the Departments of Defense and 
Energy.276 Through various departments, the executive branch 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. See, e.g., Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding that 
the FTC had the power to order Branch to cease and desist in a diploma mill 
in Latin America).  
 272. See Jesse R. Ruhl, Comment, The International Law Limits to the 
FTC’s International Activity: Does the Law of Nations Keep the FTC at Home?, 
7 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 319, 325 (1989) (“[T]he FTC does not have a different 
strategy for pursuing domestic as opposed to international activities.”). 
 273. Id. 
 274. 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 275. See Brief for the United States of America (Dep’t of Justice) as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur at 12, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122) (describing Qualcomm as a supplier of 
“mission-critical” products and services to the United States). 
 276. See Declaration of Department of Energy Chief Information Officer 
Max Everett, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 
19-16122); Declaration of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment Ellen M. Lord, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 
2020) (No. 19-16122). 
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has taken strong steps to protect Qualcomm amidst the 
technology cold war between the United States and China. This 
suit threatened to do the opposite. 
Qualcomm is the world’s largest manufacturer of 
smartphone chips.277 It is also the only American company that 
manufactures such chips, with China-backed Huawei as one of 
its biggest competitors.278 These two companies are at the heart 
of a battle between the United States and China for 
technological dominance.279 Qualcomm and Huawei are central 
to the development of 5G, the new standard network for mobile 
devices.280 The outcome of the 5G race will determine whether 
the U.S. will continue to dominate the technology industry, or if 
it will “cede that control to China, which sees technological 
dominance as a way to become a world superpower.”281 National 
security experts worry that if Huawei dominates the 5G market, 
it could use its networks for espionage or shut down critical 
communications.282 Many lawmakers have also expressed 
 
 277. See Jene Park, Samsung Became the Third Largest Smartphone 
Application Processor Vendor Globally in 2019, COUNTERPOINT (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/Q74S-BSDL (showing that Qualcomm had 33.4 percent of the 
global smartphone application processor market share in 2019, the most of 
any company). 
 278. See Brian Fung, Qualcomm Is Now Alone at Top of 5G Chip Market, 
LEDGER (Apr. 18, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://perma.cc/Z3LG-RBJC (naming 
Qualcomm’s biggest competitors as Huawei and Samsung); Rob Enderle, 
Qualcomm vs. Huawei: Is This a Battle Between Companies or Countries?, IT 
BUS. EDGE (Mar. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/9ELC-AMRY.  
 279. See The Threat of a U.S.-China “Tech Cold War”, AXIOS (Nov. 18, 
2019), https://perma.cc/JUR2-Q2XX (describing a tech cold war between the 
U.S. and China as “the greatest threat to globalization since the end of World 
War II”). 
 280. See Ethan Epstein, The Little-Known Court Case That Could Damage 
U.S. National Security, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/6248-
DD7X (stating that 5G networks will allow for autonomous vehicles, 
robo-surgeries, smart cities, and drone flying); Daniel Shane & Sherisse Pham, 
Why the US Killed Broadcom’s Giant Bid for Qualcomm, CNN (Mar. 13, 2018, 
7:31 AM), https://perma.cc/K854-JQ4J. 
 281. Reardon, supra note 251. 
 282. Id. 
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concern with China’s rise in technology, fearing a Chinese 
surveillance state.283 
In addressing these threats, President Trump blocked an 
attempted acquisition of Qualcomm by Broadcom in 2018.284 
The president expressed concern that Broadcom, a Singaporean 
company, would cut off Qualcomm’s R&D and enable Huawei to 
dominate the marketplace.285 The transaction was blocked 
through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS), a committee comprised of executive branch 
officers such as the secretaries of the Treasury, Justice, 
Homeland Security, Commerce, and Defense—all directly 
responsible to the president.286 CFIUS reviews economic 
transactions by foreign entities and advises the president, who 
can block transactions that threaten national security.287 
CFIUS reviews have increased steadily in the last decade and 
Chinese transactions have accounted for the majority of the 
investigations.288  
Outside of CFIUS, the executive branch imposed 
restrictions on Huawei and affiliated companies. In 2019, the 
U.S. Commerce Department placed Huawei on a trade blacklist 
based on national security concerns.289 In announcing the 
action, the secretary of commerce cited a presidential directive 
ordering the department to be vigilant in protecting national 
 
 283. Nitasha Tiku, Big Tech: Breaking Us Up Will Only Help China, WIRED 
(May 23, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/HL4J-QPHC.  
 284. Kate O’Keeffe, Trump Orders Broadcom to Cease Attempt to Buy 
Qualcomm, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2018, 12:33 PM), https://perma.cc/656Z-
PWX8. 
 285. Id. (describing the attempted acquisition as a national security risk). 
 286. CFIUS Overview, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://perma.cc/L3UT-
G64G. 
 287. CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (Dec. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/8SBU-V9AE (PDF). 
 288. See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 18, 
https://perma.cc/36NH-MS5T (PDF) (stating that Chinese investors received 
the most notices from 2015 to 2017). 
 289. Department of Commerce Announces the Addition of Huawei 
Technologies Co. Ltd. to the Entity List, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE (2019) https://
perma.cc/QBA2-7JLA. 
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security activities.290 In 2020, the DOJ indicted Huawei for 
intellectual property theft and conspiring to steal trade 
secrets.291 The international importance of the U.S. actions is 
underscored by its joining a movement of democracies to isolate 
Huawei and promote other companies as 5G providers.292  
China has also taken counteractions against U.S. 
technology, making any mechanism the United States has in 
this struggle more important. In 2018, Chinese antitrust 
regulators blocked Qualcomm from acquiring rival chipmaker 
NXP.293 The Trump administration had lobbied the Chinese 
government to approve the deal, which would have allowed 
Qualcomm to expand into new market areas.294 In 2019, the 
Chinese government ordered Chinese public institutions to 
replace foreign software and computer equipment with domestic 
suppliers within a few years.295 In sum, both China and the U.S. 
have leveraged antitrust regulation to give domestic companies 
a strategic international competitive advantage. And this 
 
 290. See id. (explaining that a placement on the Entity List “will prevent 
American technology from being used by foreign owned entities” in a 
potentially threatening way).  
 291. Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries 
Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/B8LX-6QQH.  
 292. See Srijan Shukla, UK Wants 5G Alliance of 10 Countries, Including 
India, to Avoid Reliance on Chinese Huawei, PRINT (May 29, 2020, 4:34 PM), 
https://perma.cc/9WWW-69W4 (noting that the United Kingdom is pursuing 
an alliance of ten democratic countries, including the United States, that 
would seek to create an alternative pool of 5G technology and equipment). 
 293. Liana B. Baker & Greg Roumeliotis, Qualcomm Says China Comment 
Will Not Revive NXP Deal, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2018, 12:21 AM), https://perma.cc
/53YK-V9LK; Sherisse Pham, China Kills Qualcomm’s $44 Billion Deal for 
NXP, CNN (July 26, 2018, 7:07 AM), https://perma.cc/C2LG-NVNY (stating 
that Qualcomm confirmed that it was “terminating its proposed takeover of 
Dutch counterpart NXP . . . after China failed to grant it regulatory 
approval”). 
 294. See Matt Rosoff, Qualcomm Reportedly Says It Sees No Prospect for 
NXP Deal Despite US-China Trade Truce, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2018, 12:37 AM), 
https://perma.cc/T88T-CMFZ (noting actions taken by the White House to 
appease China in hopes of reviving the Qualcomm deal). 
 295. REBECCA FANNIN, STAKES RISE IN U.S.-CHINA TECH COLD WAR WITH 
LATEST BLOCK 1–2 (2019), https://perma.cc/S8RC-JYE9 (PDF) (describing the 
split in software and computer equipment as a “splinternet”). 
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technology war is only one part of a broader strained trade 
relationship between the United States and China.296 The White 
House has reported that China’s market-distorting policies and 
economic aggression pose a threat to the global economy.297 A 
2018 report pointed to state-sponsored IP theft through cyber 
espionage and forced technology transfer regulations.298 Since 
2018, the two countries have had to negotiate various tariffs and 
trade agreements.299 
Therefore, it is highly anomalous that the FTC has 
exercised its prosecutorial discretion to bring an antitrust action 
against Qualcomm that will—in coordination with China’s 
actions—directly benefit Huawei and aid China in its foreign 
policy goals, when the president and his advisors are actively 
pursuing exactly the opposite goal. The problem created by the 
struggle for technological dominance and antitrust’s role in it 
goes beyond this single case, important as it is. As of 2018, 
China had nine of the world’s top twenty technology 
companies.300 Big Tech executives have argued that breaking up 
Big Tech under antitrust law will only help Chinese companies 
dominate the industry.301 Effectively, they promote a “national 
 
 296. See Rick Gladstone, How the Cold War Between China and U.S. Is 
Intensifying, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/KW2C-UG9B (last 
updated July 24, 2020) (“In defense, trade, technology, media and diplomacy, 
among other areas, the rancor between the Trump administration and China’s 
ruling Communist Party is worsening.”). 
 297. WHITE HOUSE OFF. TRADE AND MFG. POL’Y, HOW CHINA’S ECONOMIC 
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/KY4U-HS9M 
(PDF).  
 298. Id. at 2–5. 
 299. United States and China Reach Phase One Trade Agreement, OFF. 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Dec. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/5WJL-VWF8. 
 300. See Stephen Armstrong, Splitting Up Facebook and Google Would 
Be Great for China, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/UD7X-THXB 
(listing the nine companies, ranked by market valuation, located in China 
and their respective roles in the tech sphere). 
 301. See id. (noting that if the big American companies get broken up, 
there is a fear that no equally formidable Western player will be left to defend 
against Chinese companies); Tiku, supra note 283 (stating that Facebook’s 
chief operating officer and the CEO of Google have both expressed the idea 
that breaking up Big Tech will only serve China). 
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champion” view: the nation needs powerful, dominant 
companies lest a foreign company take the helm.302 Some 
scholars have criticized national champion policies, stating that 
any short-term advantages are outweighed by the harm to 
national innovation.303 Regardless, the battle over the future of 
technology shows how antitrust regulation plays a key role in a 
struggle for technological, economic, and political power—and 
that the U.S. needs a single, president-coordinated agency to 
guide the process. 
The problem of integrating antitrust with the rest of foreign 
policy is not unique to China or President Trump. President 
Barack Obama, like President Trump, accused the EU of 
pursuing antitrust or regulatory actions against Big Tech in 
order to help their own tech companies compete.304 Some 
countries in the EU are using state authority to promote 
national champions to combat U.S. tech dominance.305 For 
instance, France and Germany have spent significant 
government resources in attempts to create a European rival to 
U.S, cloud computing companies.306 France has additionally 
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with China, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/8KMX-AB68 
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 303. See Daniel Kishi, Against Bigness? Begin by Breaking Up Big Tech, 
AM. CONSERVATIVE (Nov. 28, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://perma.cc/9LLH-BAJG 
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 304. See Gaines, supra note 16 (“President Obama said the European 
companies were sore losers and were using their governments to gain footing 
against American rivals.”); Toman, supra note 16 (“US President Donald 
Trump attacked the European Union for taking action against US tech 
companies such as Google and Facebook over antitrust issues.”). 
 305. See Adam Satariano & Monika Pronczuk, Europe, Overrun by Foreign 
Tech Giants, Wants to Grow Its Own, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://
perma.cc/J8T8-U65C (“[European Union] [o]fficials laid out some broad ideas 
that suggest the authorities will seek to nurture homegrown businesses by 
taking on the giants from overseas . . . .”). 
 306. See Mark Scott, What’s Driving Europe’s New Aggressive Stance on 
Tech, POLITICO (Oct. 29, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://perma.cc/Y7V7-RZV3 (“The 
countries’ joint efforts to create a European rival to Google, known as Quaero, 
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levied a tax on digital giants, commonly dubbed “GAFA,” 
because it will primarily affect American tech companies 
Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon.307 U.S. antitrust 
regulators must also counter these threats to the American 
economy and technological dominance when exercising 
prosecutorial discretion over enforcement actions in the 
technological arena. 
The competition for technological dominance is an enduring 
fact of our age. Moreover, technology is encompassing more and 
more important industries, encapsulated in the saying that 
“software is eating the world.”308 It is thus more important today 
for the nation’s antitrust policy to be aligned with other foreign 
policy actions taken by the executive branch.309 The FTC should 
not be able to bring antitrust actions when they can cut against 
the various other international efforts taken by the country. 
B.  Consolidating Antitrust Enforcement under the DOJ 
Allows the FTC to Focus on Privacy 
Eliminating its jurisdiction over antitrust will also give the 
FTC the resources and focus to address issues of privacy. 
Privacy law has grown in prominence along with the rise of 
digital technology.310 While most Western countries have 
 
were quietly scrapped in 2013 after receiving millions of euros in government 
grants with little, if any, impact on the search giant’s dominance.”).  
 307. Christina Okello, France to Levy Digital Tax Despite US Decision to 
Walk Out of Talks, RFI (June 18, 2020, 4:20 PM), https://perma.cc/67KZ-
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 308. Marc Andreessen, Why Software Is Eating the World, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 20, 2011), https://perma.cc/6ZEW-W3NE. Thus, it would not be 
foresighted to simply make the DOJ responsible for industries driven by 
current technology. Moreover, dividing antitrust enforcement responsibilities 
along these lines would lead to the kind of turf fight between the FTC and the 
DOJ we have seen before—this time over what constitutes an industry with 
foreign policy effects.  
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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT  363 
 
comprehensive privacy protections, the U.S. has taken a 
piecemeal approach, with various sector-specific and 
state-specific laws.311 These uneven regulations have been 
criticized for causing confusion for businesses and failing to 
adequately protect consumers.312 In fact, 79 percent of 
Americans are concerned about the way their data is being used 
by companies and most feel that they have little to no control 
over how their personal data is used.313 
First, eliminating FTC antitrust jurisdiction would free up 
resources, enabling the agency to dedicate more of its funding, 
personnel, and time to privacy issues.314 Second, it would 
streamline the FTC’s mission, which is currently divided 
between dueling goals of consumer protection and antitrust.315 
Agencies tend to perform better when they have a cohesive 
mission.316 Removing the agency’s antitrust duties would 
resolve this problem. Narrowing the focus of the FTC’s 
responsibilities would be a significant step in the right direction 
for the agency and the future of privacy law. 
 
https://perma.cc/JH7W-PZWG (noting the rapid increase in technological 
advances and the concurrent “increasing spread of state legislation” on privacy 
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 The FTC needs more resources to adequately address the 
nation’s growing privacy concerns.317 Currently, the FTC 
oversees both consumer protection—encompassing 
privacy— and antitrust,318 making the FTC the chief federal 
agency on privacy policy and enforcement319 and the nation’s de 
facto privacy agency.320 The agency has long-standing 
experience in enforcing privacy statutes321 and also has special 
privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality 
tech forensics to track invasions of privacy.322 The FTC, 
however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of 
privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern 
technology.323 Very few Americans feel confident in the privacy 
of their information in the digital age.324 According to a 2019 
study, over 80 percent of Americans feel that they have little to 
no control over the data collected on them by companies and the 
government.325 To adequately address privacy concerns, the 
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 322. See id. (noting that the FTC has spent the last decade developing an 
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technology experts to assist in that effort”). 
 323. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Cecilia Kang, Facebook Data 
Scandals Stoke Criticism That a Privacy Watchdog Too Rarely Bites, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/6RR2-NRUM (describing concerns 
about the FTC’s ability to adequately address privacy concerns associated with 
technological advances). 
 324. See Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, 
Security and Surveillance, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 20, 2015), https://perma.cc
/L7BG-232E (“Americans have little confidence that their data will remain 
private and secure.”). 
 325. Auxier et al., supra note 313. 
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FTC needs more resources.326 The agency has been explicit that 
it needs more manpower to police tech companies.327 In 
requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director 
Joseph Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire 
additional staff and bring more privacy cases.328 A former 
director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which 
houses the privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully 
understaffed.”329  
As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees 
dedicated to privacy and data security, compared to 500 and 110 
employees at comparable agencies in the U.K. and Ireland, 
respectively.330 Without more lawyers, investigators, and 
technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy 
investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, forgo them 
altogether.331 Currently, the FTC’s resources are spread thin 
across multiple missions, to the detriment of its privacy efforts. 
Removing the agency’s antitrust responsibilities would 
reallocate resources from the antitrust department to its 
privacy unit and other areas of consumer protection.332 Further, 
it would free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee 
this essential effort.333  
This reallocation of resources is especially timely because 
the FTC’s privacy responsibilities are expected to grow in the 
 
 326. See Shaun G. Jamison, Creating a National Data Privacy Law for the 
United States, 10 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 33 (2019). 
 327. See Harper Neidig, FTC Says It Only Has 40 Employees Overseeing 
Privacy and Data Security, HILL  (Apr. 3, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://perma.cc
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 328. Id.  
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TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/F4FK-L46P. 
 330. See Neidig, supra note 327. 
 331. See id.  
 332. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 314, at 1145 (“[T]he long-term 
result of making the FTC the nation’s top privacy cop may transform the 
agency into a consumer protection/privacy regulator, rather than a consumer 
protection/antitrust regulator.”). 
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agency could concentrate on consumerism. Handler, supra note 187, at 1320.  
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future. The FTC is already on its way to becoming a consumer 
protection agency primarily focused on privacy.334 In its 2019 
budget request to Congress, over half of the agency’s budget was 
allocated to privacy.335 In addition, lawmakers on both sides of 
the political spectrum have proposed federal privacy 
legislation.336 Such legislation would expand the FTC’s 
jurisdiction, empower it to bring more privacy actions, and 
increase the demands on its privacy resources.337 Right now, the 
U.S. is one of the only Western countries that does not have a 
comprehensive federal privacy law.338 Public pressure is great 
from both industry and scholars to change that, which would 
lead to increased privacy action at the federal level.339 Moving 
the FTC’s antitrust duties to the DOJ would cleanly complete a 
readjusting of priorities that is already happening organically.  
Removing its authority over competition law would also 
provide the FTC with organizational clarity. Currently, the 
agency serves dual missions of antitrust and consumer 
protection. Originally, the FTC only had antitrust jurisdiction: 
the FTC Act banned “unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce.”340 In 1931, the Supreme Court held that 
 
 334. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 314, at 1145. 
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After Bipartisan Talks Break Down, HILL (Mar. 12, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://
perma.cc/F8LC-RY4H (stating that the legislative proposals show some 
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 337. Neidig, supra note 327. 
 338. See Birnbaum, supra note 336 (“[T]he U.S. is one of the only countries 
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around how corporations collect personal information on their users.”).  
 339. See Dina Temple-Raston, Why the Tech Industry Wants Federal 
Control over Data Privacy Laws, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/AH8G-YM6F (indicating that the tech industry supports 
federal legislation that would preempt potentially restrictive state legislation); 
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 905 (2009) 
(considering arguments for and against a federal omnibus law that would fill 
the gaps in the patchwork of state privacy law). 
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this did not include consumer protection.341 In 1938, Congress 
passed the Wheeler-Lea Act,342 which amended the FTC Act to 
cover “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”343 This paved the 
way for the FTC’s modern consumer protection mission.344 Since 
then, the agency has had to pursue goals that are sometimes in 
conflict. 
Consumer protection laws prevent companies from 
misleading or cheating customers. Viewed broadly, consumer 
protection encompasses a paternalistic social goal of protecting 
consumers from themselves.345 Consumers may not wish to be 
educated on manipulative practices or dangerous products, but 
consumer protection laws aim to protect consumers despite any 
preference for ignorance. The FTC enforces numerous consumer 
protection statutes that govern bankruptcy abuse, scholarship 
fraud, tobacco education, and credit card accountability, among 
other things.346  
The FTC approaches privacy as a consumer protection 
issue.347 Accordingly, the FTC promotes privacy interests 
through its Bureau of Consumer Protection.348 At first, the 
agency pursued a limited deception-based approach to privacy 
by targeting companies that did not comply with their own 
 
 341. See FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1931) (holding that 
“unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” does not include 
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privacy policies.349 Since then, the FTC has broadened its 
approach to a harms-based inquiry against unfair handling of 
consumer data.350 The harms are generally linked to the rise of 
digital technology. For instance, consumers cannot effectively 
protect themselves in our dynamic, information-intense 
environment.351 Some argue that digital products have led to 
externalities such as reduced offline interaction, addiction by 
design, and environmental harm in the form of electronic 
garbage and energy consumption.352 Competition will result in 
the amount of privacy demanded by the market, which may not 
account for externalities and inaccurately reflect society’s 
desires compared to the amount of privacy that people would 
collectively choose through legislation.353 
 In contrast to consumer protection law, antitrust law aims 
to preserve “free and unfettered competition.”354 The foundation 
of antitrust law is now understood to be protecting consumer 
welfare that flows from economic efficiency.355 Antitrust 
promotes the free market by outlawing monopolization and 
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economic foundation of antitrust law). 
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unreasonable restraints of trade.356 Rather than the social goals 
of privacy and protection from deception promoted by consumer 
protection, antitrust pursues economic efficiency.357 
Consumer protection and free competition can work against 
each other. Consumer protection regulation has been 
empirically proven to introduce barriers to entry, especially for 
small companies.358 Environmental, safety, and health 
regulations protect consumers while inhibiting the free 
market.359 Consider a specific example of the tension between 
consumer protection and competition. The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act360 provides an important service to consumers by 
protecting the fairness, accuracy, and privacy of personal 
information kept by credit reporting agencies.361 At the same 
time, these protections introduce high compliance costs that 
have limited entry in the credit reporting industry.362 The four 
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incumbents that dominate the market were established before 
the Act was passed.363 
Safeguarding privacy as an aspect of consumer protection 
provides similar examples of tensions with promoting 
competition. In the U.S., the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Rule (COPPA) establishes strict requirements on 
websites that target children.364 These limitations guard the 
privacy of children but have also led to less innovation in 
children’s websites and apps in the country. Many apps targeted 
at children are developed in countries that have weaker privacy 
protections for children, such as Ukraine.365 The passage of 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),366 a sweeping 
privacy legislation in Europe, led to increased control by 
consumers over their personal data.367 Simultaneously, it 
decreased competition among technology vendors and shrank 
overall business.368 The anticompetitive effects are 
unsurprising, given that the average cost of compliance with the 
regulation was £1.67 million.369 Additionally, privacy regulation 
 
difficulty smaller entrants have experienced in competing in the credit 
reporting industry). 
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(2020). 
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in the U.S. focuses on regulating interfirm data transfers over 
intrafirm uses, privileging large tech companies that are able to 
commercialize user data on their own.370 This may have the 
effect of further entrenching monopolists, contrary to the goals 
of antitrust. This conflict between consumer protection, 
including the protection of privacy, and antitrust poses a 
problem of incompatible missions for the FTC. 
When Congress recognized conflicting goals in other 
agencies, it divided or reorganized them so that agencies are not 
tasked with contradictory missions. For instance, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) struggled to balance its goals of 
promoting commercial aviation and promoting aviation 
safety.371 Changes that would ensure safety were often 
abandoned because they were outweighed by financial costs that 
would harm the aviation business.372 After a high-profile plane 
crash in 1996, Congress removed the FAA’s mission in 
promoting aviation, and from then on the agency was able to 
focus solely on safety.373 The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) also experienced tensions from its dual mission. 
The agency dealt with a “mission overload and conflict” of 
enforcing immigration while also providing immigration 
services.374 Immigration enforcement keeps people out, while 
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immigration services admits entrants.375 A study concluded that 
the incompatible missions led to “competition for resources,” 
“lack of coordination and cooperation,” and “confusion regarding 
mission and responsibilities.”376 The INS itself proposed a 
restructuring to separate its conflicting goals into two separate 
agencies.377 Congress acted and created the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS) to handle immigration 
services378 and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agencies 
to handle investigative and enforcement actions.379 Given the 
proven problems with conflicting mandates, Congress should 
reorganize the FTC as it has done in the past for the FAA and 
INS. 
FTC commissioners themselves have recognized that there 
is a tension between its mandates to pursue competition and 
privacy. FTC Commissioner Christine S. Wilson has expressed 
that “both information asymmetries and the presence of 
externalities lead to inefficient outcomes with regard to privacy 
and data security.”380 While she has “great faith in markets,” 
she believes federal privacy and data security legislation is 
needed.381 FTC Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips notes that 
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updated Feb. 27, 2020) (immigration services). 
 376. Restructuring the INS, supra note 374, at 21. 
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such legislation has substantial trade-offs on competition, 
growth, and innovation that must be recognized.382 Joe Simons, 
chairman of the FTC, has made similar statements, recognizing 
that privacy protections can have the effect of reducing 
competition and entrenching large tech platforms.383 
Commissioner Phillips has addressed the issue most directly, 
remarking that: 
The tension between competition and privacy means that, 
rather than strengthening either, pushing competition and 
privacy law to converge threatens to confuse (and thus 
weaken) the enforcement of each. He who serves two masters 
serves none, they say. Where the interests of both align, 
perhaps we are less concerned. But competition and privacy 
are often at odds. Are law enforcers forced to make a choice 
that cannot be made? And how could courts review such 
decisions?384 
Creating a single antitrust agency in the DOJ resolves the 
conflict between two missions that multiple commissioners have 
acknowledged. Government reorganization is easier here than 
in these previous examples because an experienced agency is at 
the ready to undertake its responsibilities under competition 
law. Housing antitrust under the DOJ allows the FTC to pursue 
consumer protection and privacy goals without compromising 
effective antitrust enforcement.385 
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 385. Removing the FTC’s jurisdiction over antitrust law would not 
preclude the agency from considering impacts on competition in its consumer 
protection decisions. 
 
374 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2021) 
 
Focusing the FTC on privacy will also bring the United 
States into line with much of the rest of the world. In the 1980s, 
countries such as Sweden, West Germany, and France already 
had years of experience with data protection agencies.386 Since 
then, the number of stand-alone data protection agencies 
around the globe has only grown. The United Kingdom upholds 
information rights through its Information Commissioner’s 
Office,387 Germany through its Federal Commissioner for Data 
Protection and Freedom of Information,388 Tunisia through its 
National Authority for Protection of Personal Data,389 Ghana 
through its Data Protection Commission,390 Japan through its 
Personal Information Protection Commission,391 Canada 
through its Office of the Privacy Commissioner,392 Argentina 
through its National Directorate for Personal Data 
Protection,393 and Costa Rica through its Agency for the 
Protection of Individual’s Data.394 
  It is true that the FTC would not be a pure data protection 
agency, but rather a consumer protection agency with a strong 
focus on privacy. But putting privacy under the greater 
umbrella of consumer protection would have the advantages of 
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having a single regulator addressing consumer protection issues 
in a unified manner.395 For example, the FTC currently handles 
privacy and data security issues related to social media such as 
adherence to privacy policies, access to nonpublic information, 
and password requirements.396 It also regulates consumer 
protection issues that arise from social media, such as truthful 
advertising and disclosure of sponsorships.397 
Proponents of the status quo argue that consumer 
protection and competition should be considered together 
because the two goals are closely interlinked.398 Certainly, 
consumer protection and antitrust laws can sometimes be 
mutually beneficial to each other. Consumer protection can 
resolve information asymmetries that hurt competition. It can 
also bolster consumer trust in markets by preventing deceptive 
business practices.399 Antitrust laws may move us to better 
privacy protections: companies can compete based on different 
privacy protections.400 However, these small areas of overlap 
 
 395. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 320, at 585–90. 
 396. Julie Brill, Privacy & Consumer Protection in Social Media, 90 N.C. 
L. REV. 1295, 1298–99 (2012). 
 397. See id. at 1305–07 (enumerating the disclosures required of social 
media advertisers and endorsers under the amended FTC Enforcement 
Guides). 
 398. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 37, at 45 (explaining that if 
separated, “the consideration of competition values in consumer protection 
would be diluted, probably to the detriment of the public”). 
 399. See J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, FTC Consumer 
Protection at 100: 1970s Redux or Protecting Markets to Protect Consumers?, 
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2157, 2172 (2015) (“By striving to keep sellers honest, 
consumer protection policy does more than safeguard the interests of the 
individual victim—it serves the interest of consumers generally and facilitates 
competition.”). 
 400. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 314, at 1143 (“Enforcing antitrust 
law has given the FTC ongoing involvement in multiple high-tech 
markets— as well as an understanding of how competition can motivate 
companies to offer better privacy protections.”); Charles Duan et al., 
Comments on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century 
Hearings Hearing #12: The FTC’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, R STREET 
(May 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/Z9G7-KWWH (“First, privacy and 
competition are inextricably linked. Increasing protections for one may result 
in the limitation of the other. At the same time, some privacy protections can 
 
376 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2021) 
 
and positive effects do not imply an essential relationship 
between consumer protection and antitrust. If the market 
generally delivered the level of privacy that society deemed 
necessary, we would not need the current laws to protect 
privacy, nor would the Congress be considering introducing new 
and strengthened laws on the subject. By retaining its general 
consumer protection duties, the FTC would be well positioned to 
address privacy issues.401 
CONCLUSION 
Dual antitrust enforcement by the DOJ and the FTC has 
always created some problems of waste and uncertainty by 
maintaining overlapping centers of interpretive authority.402 
But technology has made these costs intolerable and added 
others. Because there are so many difficult questions about how 
to apply antitrust law to emerging technology, different 
enforcement agencies confuse companies key to our economic 
growth as these agencies try to figure out the correct way 
forward. In the important case of standard-essential patents, 
the confusion is already rampant, as the DOJ and FTC are 
locked in fundamental conflict.403 
Consolidated antitrust enforcement should be lodged in the 
DOJ.404 Technology has made antitrust more relevant to 
international affairs because technology companies can be so 
important to national security.405 Antitrust enforcement can 
harm national security by advantaging foreign companies over 
domestic ones. The DOJ, not the FTC, should be trusted to  
consider the foreign policy objectives of the United States, 
because the department is under direct control of the president, 
who has the most tools at his or her disposal to conduct 
 
actually improve competition, such as by making companies’ data practices 
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international affairs and direct national security as a 
constitutional right.406  
Consolidating antitrust enforcement in the DOJ would also 
free up the FTC to focus on privacy, another issue that is coming 
to the fore because of the rising importance of digital 
technology.407 The removal of antitrust responsibilities would 
permit FTC employees and commissioners to focus on privacy 
as one important aspect of consumer protection, already at the 
core of the agency’s statutory mission. Consolidation of antitrust 
within the DOJ would eliminate the FTC’s current mission of 
promoting market competition which at times can be 
inconsistent with promoting privacy, because privacy regulation 
may require constraints on the market. 
It is well understood that private companies must adapt to 
rapid technological change if they are to be effective in their 
markets. The structure of government needs to adapt no less. 
The division of antitrust enforcement between the DOJ and FTC 
is a paradigmatic example of a government structure whose 
weaknesses have been exacerbated by technological change. 
Consolidating antitrust enforcement within the DOJ will show 
that the federal government can reshape itself to address 
technological transformation. Its successful completion will 
provide impetus for the needed structural change in other areas 
of government so that the nation’s regulatory capacity can 
match the dynamism of our world. 
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